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Abstract
We survey the prospects for an Information Dynamics which can serve as the basis for
a fundamental theory of information, incorporating qualitative and structural as well as
quantitative aspects. We motivate our discussion with some basic conceptual puzzles: how
can information increase in computation, and what is it that we are actually computing
in general? Then we survey a number of the theories which have been developed within
Computer Science, as partial exemplifications of the kind of fundamental theory which we
seek: including Domain Theory, Dynamic Logic, and Process Algebra. We look at recent
work showing new ways of combining quantitative and qualitative theories of information,
as embodied respectively by Domain Theory and Shannon Information Theory. Then we
look at Game Semantics and Geometry of Interaction, as examples of dynamic models of
logic and computation in which information flow and interaction are made central and
explicit. We conclude by looking briefly at some key issues for future progress.
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1 Prelude: Some Basic Puzzles
Before attempting a conventional introduction to this article, we shall formulate some basic
puzzles which may serve as motivation for, and an indication of, some of the themes we shall
address.
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1.1 Does Information Increase in Computation?
Let us begin with a simple-minded question:
Why do we compute?
The natural answer is: to gain information (which we did not previously have)! But how is
this possible?1
Problem 1: Isn’t the output implied by the input?
Problem 2: Doesn’t this contradict the second law of thermodynamics?
A logical form of Problem 1 This problem lies adjacent to another one at the roots of
logic. If we extract logical consequences of axioms, then surely the answer was already there
implicitly in the axioms; what has been added by the derivation? Since computation can itself,
via the Curry-Howard isomorphism [46, 73, 62], be modelled as performing Cut elimination
on proofs, or normalization of terms, the same question can be asked of computation. A
normal form which is presented as the result of a computation is logically equal to the term
we started with:
M −→∗ N =⇒ JMK = JNK.
so what has been added by computing it?
The same issue can be formulated in terms of the logic programming paradigm, or of
querying a relational database [43]: in both cases, the result of the query is a logical conse-
quence of the data- or knowledge-base.
The challenge here is to build a useful theory which provides convincing and helpful
answers to these questions. We simply make some preliminary observations. Note that
normal forms are in general unmanagably big [119]. Useful output has two aspects:
• Making information explicit—i.e. extracting the normal form.
• Data reduction—getting rid of a lot of the information in the input.
(Note that it is deletion of data which creates thermodynamic cost in computation [84]). Thus
we can say that much (or all?) of the actual usefulness of computation lies in getting rid of
the hay-stack, leaving only the needle.
Problem 2: Discussion While information is presumably conserved in the total system,
there can be information flow between, and information increase in, subsystems. (A body
can gain heat from its environment). More precisely, while the entropy of an isolated (total)
system cannot decrease, a sub-system can decrease its entropy by consuming energy from its
environment.
Thus if we wish to speak of information flow and increase, this must be done relative
to subsystems. Indeed, the fundamental objects of study should be open systems, whose
behaviour must be understood in relation to an external environment. Subsystems which can
observe incoming information from their environment, and act to send information to their
environment, have the capabilities of agents.
1Indeed, I was once challenged on this point by an eminent physicist (now knighted), who demanded to
know how I could speak of information increasing in computation when Shannon Information theory tells us
that it cannot! My failure to answer this point very convincingly at the time led me to continue to ponder the
issue, and eventually gave rise to this discussion.
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Observer-dependence of information increase Yorick Wilks (personal communication)
has suggested the following additional twist. Consider an equation such as
3× 5 = 15.
The forward direction 3× 5 → 15 is obviously a natural direction of computation, where we
perform a multiplication. But the reverse direction 15 → 3 × 5 is also of interest — finding
the prime factors of a number! So the direction of possible information increase must be
understood as relative to the observer or user of the computation.2
Moral: Agents and their interactions are intrinsic to the study of information flow and
increase in computation. The classical theories of information do not reflect this adequately.
1.2 What Function Does the Internet Compute?
Our second puzzle reflects the changing conception of computation which has been developing
within Computer Science over the past three decades. The traditional conception of computa-
tion is that we compute an output as a function of an input, by an algorithmic process. This
is the basic setting for the entire field of algorithms and complexity, for example. So what we
are computing is clear — it is a function.3 But the reality of modern computing: distributed,
global, mobile, interactive, multi-media, embedded, autonomous, virtual, pervasive, . . . 4 —
forces us to confront the limitations of this viewpoint.
Traditionally, the dynamics of computing systems — their unfolding behaviour in space
and time — has been a mere means to the end of computing the function which specifies the
algorithmic problem which the system is solving.5 In much of contemporary computing, the
situation is reversed: the purpose of the computing system is to exhibit certain behaviour.
The implementation of this required behaviour will seek to reduce various aspects of the
specification to the solution of standard algorithmic problems.
What does the Internet compute?
Surely not a mathematical function . . .
Moral: We need a theory of the dynamics of informatic processes, of interaction, and in-
formation flow, as a basis for answering such fundamental questions as :
• What is computed?
• What is a process?
• What are the analogues to Turing-completeness and universality when we are concerned
with processes and their behaviours, rather than the functions which they compute?
2Formally, this can be understood in terms of different choices of normal forms. For a general perspective
on rewriting as a computational paradigm, see [29, 117].
3We may, if we are willing to countenance non-deterministic or probabilistic computation, be willing to
stretch this functional paradigm to accomodate relations or stochastic relations of some kind. These are minor
variations, compared to the shift to a fully-fledged dynamical perspective.
4See e.g. [102, 103].
5Insofar as the dynamics has been of interest, it has been in quantitative terms, counting the resources
which the algorithmic process consumes — leading of course to the notions of algorithmic complexity. Is it too
fanciful to speculate that the lack of an adequate structural theory of processes may have been an impediment
to fundamental progress in complexity theory?
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2 Introduction: Matter and Method
Philosophers of science are concerned with explaining various aspects of science, and often,
moreover, with viewing science as a kind of gold-mine of philosophical opportunity. The di-
rection in both cases is philosophy from science. For a theoretical or mathematical scientist,
the primary inclination is often to see conceptual analysis as a preliminary to a more techni-
cal investigation, which may lead to a new theoretical development. In short: science from
philosophy. This article is written mainly in the latter spirit, from the stand-point of Theoret-
ical Computer Science, or perhaps more broadly “Theoretical Informatics”: a — still largely
putative — general science of information. That being said, we hope that our conceptual
discussions may also provide some useful grist to the philosopher’s mill.
2.1 Towards Information Dynamics
The best-known existing mathematical theories of information are (largely) static in nature.
That is, they do not explicitly describe informatic processes and information flow, but rather
certain invariants of these processes and flows. There is by now ample experience from
Computer Science which indicates that it is fruitful, and eventually necessary, to develop
fully-fledged dynamical theories. We shall try to map some steps in this direction.
We begin by reviewing some of the theories developed in Computer Science which form
the background for our discussion. Then we consider another important issue in theories of
information: the distinction between qualitative and quantitative theories, and how they can
be reconciled — or, more positively, combined. Our discussion here will still be at the level
of static theories. We then go on to consider dynamic theories proper.
This article is well outside the author’s usual remit as a researcher. While it is clearly not
a contribution to philosophy, it cannot be said to be the usual kind of conceptually-oriented
overview of a scientific field which one might find in such a Handbook (and of which there are
some fine examples in the present volume) either; not least for the reason that the scientific
field we are attempting to overview does not exist yet, in a fully realized form at any rate.
Rather, the main purpose of this article is to play some small part in helping this field to
come into being.
What, then, is this nascent field? We would like to use the term Information Dynamics,
which was proposed some time ago by Robin Milner, to suggest how the area of Theoretical
Computer Science usually known as “Semantics” might emancipate itself from its traditional
focus on interpreting the syntax of pre-existing programming languages, and become a more
autonomous study of the fundamental structures of Informatics.6 The development of such
a field would transform our scientific vision of Information, and give us a whole new set of
tools for thinking about it. Hence its relevance for any attempt to develop a Philosophy of
Information.
Rather than a developed field of Information Dynamics, with some consensus as to what
its fundamental notions and methods are, what we have at present are some partial exemplifi-
cations; some theories which have been shown to work well over certain ranges of applications,
and which exhibit both conceptual and mathematical depth. Our approach to conveying the
current state of the art, and indicating the major objectives visible from where we stand now,
is necessarily largely based on describing (some of) these current theories. The obvious dan-
ger with this approach is that this article will appear to be a disjointed series of descriptions
6Robin Milner has also written several articles in the same general spirit as this one, notably [100].
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of various formalisms. We have probably not succeeded in avoiding this completely—despite
the author’s best efforts. But we regard the expository aspect of this article as important in
itself. The theories we shall expound deserve to be known in wider circles than they presently
are. And our discussions of Domain Theory, Game semantics and Geometry of Interaction
delve more into conceptual issues, while minimizing the level of technical detail, than other
accounts of which we are aware.
2.2 Some Themes
To assist the reader in keeping their bearings, we mention some of the main themes which
will thread through our discussion:
Information Increase in Computation We compute in order to gain information: but
how is this possible, logically or thermodynamically? How can it be reconciled with
the point of view of Information Theory? How does information increase appear in the
various extant theories? This will be an important explicit theme in our discussion of
background theories in Section 3, and particularly in Section 4. Obtaining a good ac-
count in the context of dynamic theories, as exemplified by those presented in Sections 5
and 6, is a key desideratum for future work.
Unifying Quantitative and Qualitative Theories of Information We mainly discuss
this explicitly in Section 4, where we describe some striking recent progress which has
been achieved by Keye Martin and Bob Coecke, in the setting of current static theories
of information (Scott Domain Theory and Shannon Information Theory). A similar
development in the setting of the dynamic theories described in Sections 5 and 6 is a
major objective for future research.
Information Dynamics: Logic and Geometry We introduce Game Semantics and Ge-
ometry of Interaction in Sections 5 and 6 as substantial partial exemplications of In-
formation Dynamics. They have strong connections to both Logic and Geometry, and
form a promising new bridge between these two fields. While we shall not be able to
do full justice to these topics, we hope at least to raise the reader’s awareness of these
developments, and to provide pointers into the literature.
The Power of Copying, and Logical Emergence This is mainly developed in Section 6,
in the context of Geometry of Interaction-type models. The theme here is to look at how
logically complex behaviour can emerge from very simple “copy-cat processes”, showing
the power of interaction. The links between the interactive and geometric points of view
become very clear at this basic level.
One theme which we have, regretfully, omitted is that of the emerging connections with
Physics, in particular with Quantum Information and Computation. Here there is
already much to say (see e.g. [8, 9, 10]). We have not included this material simply for lack
of the appropriate physical resources of space, time and energy.
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3 Some Background Theories
Following our previous discussion, we can classify theories of information along two axes: as
static or dynamic, and as qualitative or quantitative. We list some examples in the following
table.
Static Dynamic
Qualitative Domain Theory, Process Algebra
Dynamic Logic
Quantitative Shannon Information theory
It may seem strange to list Dynamic Logic as a static theory — and indeed, not everyone
would agree with this classification! We regard it as static because it considers input-output
relations only, and not the structure of the processes which realize these relations. The
distinction we have in mind will become clearer when we go on to discuss Process Algebra.
Shannon Information theory is discussed in detail in another Chapter of this Handbook. In
this Section, we shall give brief overviews of the other three theories listed above, which have
all been developed within Computer Science—Domain Theory and Dynamic Logic originating
in the 1970’s, and Process Algebra in the 1980’s.
It may be useful to give a timeline for some of the seminal publications:
1948 Claude Shannon A Mathematical Theory of Communication Information Theory
1963 Saul Kripke Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic Kripke Structures
1969 Dana Scott Outline of a Mathematical Theory of Computation Domain Theory
Tony Hoare An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming Hoare Logic
1976 Vaughan Pratt Semantical Considerations on Floyd-Hoare Logic Dynamic Logic
Johan van Benthem Modal Correspondence Theory Bisimulation
1980 Robin Milner A Calculus of Communicating Systems Process Algebra
The work on Game Semantics and Geometry of Interaction to be covered in Sections 5 and
6 comes from the 1990’s. As always, a full intellectual history is complex, and we shall not
attempt this here.
We shall devote rather more space to Domain Theory than to the other two theories, for
the following reasons:
• Domain Theory is more intrinsically and explicitly a theory of information than Dynamic
Logic or Process Algebra, and will figure significantly in our subsequent discussions.
• The other theories will receive some coverage elsewhere in this Handbook, notably in
the Chapter by Baltag and Moss.
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3.1 Domain Theory
Domain Theory was introduced by Dana Scott c. 1970 [113] as a mathematical foundation for
the denotational semantics of programming languages which had been pioneered by Christo-
pher Strachey. A domain is a partially ordered structure (D,⊑). The best intuitive reading
of elements of D is as information states. We pass immediately to some illustrative examples.
3.1.1 Examples of Domains
Flat Domains Given a set X, we can form a domain X⊥ by adjoining an element
⊥ 6∈ X, and defining an order by
x ⊑ y ⇐⇒ x = ⊥ ∨ x = y.
Frequently used examples : N⊥, B⊥, O = 1⊥. Here N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, the set of natural
numbers; B = {tt,ff}, the set of booleans; and 1 = {∗}, an (arbitrary) one-element set.
We can use such flat domains to model computations in terms of very simple processes
of information increase. Thus a (possibly non-terminating) natural number computation can
be modelled in N⊥ in the following sense. Initially, no output has been produced. This “zero
information state” is represented by the bottom element ⊥. If the computation terminates,
a natural number n is produced. Thus we obtain the “process”
⊥ ⊑ n.
The case where no output is ever produced is captured by the “stationary process” ⊥, which
we can view more “dynamically” as
⊥ ⊑ ⊥ ⊑ · · ·
Streams Now consider the scenario where we have an unbounded or potentially infinite
tape (much as for the output tape of a Turing machine), on successive squares of which symbols
from some finite alphabet Σ can be printed. This computational scenario is naturally modelled
by the domain Σ∞, the set of finite and infinite sequences of elements of Σ. This is ordered
by prefix : x ⊑ y if x = y, or x is finite, and for some (finite or infinite) sequence z, xz = y.
Example:
〈0〉 ⊑ 〈0, 0〉 ⊑ 〈0, 0, 0〉 ⊑ · · · ⊑ 0ω
where 0ω is the infinite sequence of 0’s.
This example shows the ability of domain theory to model infinite computations as limits
of processes of information increase, where at each stage in the process the information state
is finite.
It is important to distinguish a finite stream in this domain from a finite list as a stan-
dard programming data structure, e.g. in LISP. A finite list in standard usage is a complete,
informationally perfect object, just like a natural number in our previous example. A finite
stream, by contrast, has a “sting in the tail”; a potentially infinite computation to determine
what the remaining elements to be printed on the output tape will be. Thus a finite stream in
the above domain is an informationally incomplete object, which can be extended to a more
defined stream, which it then approximates.
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The Interval Domain Now suppose our computational scenario is that we are com-
puting a real number in the unit interval [0, 1]. Clearly we can only compute to finite precision
in finite time (and with finite resources), so we are forced to consider a scenario of approxima-
tion. The appropriate domain here is I[0, 1], consisting of all closed non-empty intervals [a, b]
where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1. We read an interval [a, b] as expressing our current state of information
about the real r ∈ [0, 1] we are computing, namely that a ≤ r ≤ b. The ordering is by reverse
inclusion of intervals, or equivalently by
[a, b] ⊑ [c, d] ⇐⇒ a ≤ c ∧ d ≤ b.
This corresponds to refinement of our information state to a more accurate determination of
the location of the ideal element r. Note that the case [r, r] is allowed, for any r ∈ [0, 1]. In
fact, this embeds the unit interval into the interval domain as the set of maximal elements of
I[0, 1]. Note that for any real number r ∈ [0, 1], there is a process of information increase
[0, 1] ⊑ [a1, b1] ⊑ [a2, b2] ⊑ · · ·
where an+1 = an and bn+1 = (an + bn)/2 if r is in the left half-interval of [an, bn], and
an+1 = (an + bn)/2 and bn+1 = bn if r is in the right half-interval. Clearly r is the supremum
of the an and the infimum of the bn. Thus every real can be computed as the limit of a
process of information increase where at each finite stage of the process the interval has
rational end-points, and hence is a finitely representable information state.7
Partial Functions A somewhat more abstract example is provided by the setPfn(X,Y )
of partial functions from X to Y , ordered by inclusion. To see how this can be used in com-
putational modelling, consider the recursive definition of the factorial function:
fact(n) = n! = n · (n− 1) · (n − 2) · · · 2 · 1.
fact(n) = if n = 0 then 1 else n× fact(n− 1).
We can understand this recursive definition as specifying a process of information increase
over the domain Pfn(N,N). Initially, we are at the zero information state (least element of
the domain) ∅; we know nothing about which ordered pairs are in the graph of the function
being defined recursively. Inspection of the base case of the recursion (where n = 0) allows
us to deduce that the pair (0, 1) is in the graph of the function. Once we know this, we can
infer that in the case n = 1,
fact(1) = 1× fact(0) = 1× 1 = 1.
Thus the process of information increase proceeds as follows:
∅ ⊆ {(0, 1)} ⊆ {(0, 1), (1, 1)} ⊆ · · ·
We can see inductively that the n’th term in this sequence will give the values of factorial on
the arguments from 0 to n − 1; and the least upper bound of this increasing sequence, given
simply by its union, will be the factorial function.
7We are glossing over some technical subtleties here. The interval domain is a basic example of a continuous
domain—the only one we shall encounter in this brief sketch of domain theory. This means that “finiteness”
does not have the same “absolute” status in this case that it does in our other examples.(Formally, intervals
with rational end-points are not compact.) Nevertheless, these finitely representable intervals do play a natural
role in the effective presentation of the domain, and the example is an important one for conveying the basic
intuitions of Domain Theory. See [20, 57] for extensive coverage of continuous domains.
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3.1.2 Technical Issues
These examples serve to motivate a number of additional axioms for domains. There is in
fact no unique axiom system for domains. We shall mention the most fundamental forms of
such axioms.
Completeness As we have seen, an essential point of Domain Theory is to allow the descrip-
tion of infinite computations or computational objects as limits of processes of information
increase. A corresponding property of completeness of domains is required, to ensure that
a well-defined unique limit exists for every such process. Such limits are expressed as least
upper bounds in order-theoretic terms. The idea is that for a process
d0 ⊑ d1 ⊑ d2 ⊑ · · ·
the limit should contain all the information produced at any stage of the process; and only
the information produced by some stage of the process. The first point implies that the limit
should be an upper bound; the second, that it should be the least upper bound.
Which class of increasing sets should be regarded as processes of information increase?
The most basic class, which has figured in all our examples to date, is that of increasing
sequences, or “ω-chains” in the usual technical parlance. The axiom requiring completeness
for all such chains, which picks out the class of “ω-complete partial orders”, or ω-cpos for
short, is often used in Domain Theory. We shall henceforth assume that all domains we
consider are ω-cpos. Sometimes completeness for a larger class of sets, the directed sets, is
used. This reflects technical issues akin to the distinction in Topology between sequential
completeness and completeness for nets or ultrafilters, and we shall not pursue this here.
Least Elements All our examples have had a least element: ⊥ for flat domains, the empty
stream for Σ∞, the unit interval [0, 1] for I[0, 1], and the empty set for Pfn(X,Y ). This
provides a zero information point, and hence a canonical starting point for processes of infor-
mation increase. Mathematically, least elements are essential for the least fixed point theorem
which we shall encounter shortly. There are schemes for Domain Theory in which domains (or
“pre-domains”) are not required to have least elements in general, but they always enter the
theory at crucial points, sometimes through a general operation of adjoining a least element
to a predomain to form a domain (“lifting”).
Approximation The intuition developed through our examples for how general elements
of the domain can be approximated by others, which may in particular be of finite character,
is captured formally by requiring domains to be algebraic or continuous. We shall not develop
these notions here, but will simply note for our examples:
• For flat domains such as N⊥, we can regard all elements as of finite character.
• Every stream in Σ∞ can be realized as the least upper bound of an increasing sequence
of finite streams.
• Every real in [0, 1], and more generally every interval in I[0, 1], can be realized as the
least upper bound of an increasing sequence of intervals with rational end-points.
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• Every partial function in Pfn(X,Y ), and in particular every total function from X
to Y , where X and Y are countable, can be realized as the least upper bound of an
increasing sequence of finite partial functions. (The case where X is uncountable is a
typical example where we would naturally resort to general directed sets rather than
sequences.)
3.1.3 Conceptual Issues
Why Partial Orders? Having developed some examples and intuitions, we now re-examine
the basic concept of domains as partial orders (D,⊑). If we think of the elements of D as
information states, the way we articulate this structure is qualitative in character. That is,
we don’t ask how much information a given state contains, but rather a relational question:
does one state convey more information than another? We read d ⊑ e as “e conveys at least
as much information as d”. If we consider the partial order axioms with this reading:
Reflexivity x ⊑ x
Transitivity x ⊑ y ∧ y ⊑ z =⇒ x ⊑ z
Anti-Symmetry x ⊑ y ∧ y ⊑ x =⇒ x = y.
then Reflexivity is clear; and Transitivity also very natural. Anti-Symmetry can be seen as
embodying an important Principle of Extensionality : if two states convey the same informa-
tion, they are regarded as equal.
States of What? We have been using the term “information state” to convey the intuition
for what the elements of a domain represent. In fact, there is a certain creative ambiguity
lurking here, between two interpretations of what these are states of :
• We may think of states of a computational system in itself, characterized in terms of
the information they contain, as an “intrinsic” or “objective” property of the system,
independently of any observer.
• We may implicitly introduce an observer of the system, and understand the information
content of a system in terms of the observer’s state of information about it.
In the first reading, we think of the partial elements of the domain in an ontological way, as
necessary extensions to our universe of discourse to represent the range of possible outputs
of computational systems which may run for ever, and may fail to terminate or to produce
information beyond some finite stage of the computation. In the second reading, we are
thinking epistemologically: what information can the observer gain about the computation.
In fact, both readings are useful—and are widely used. It is very common to slip without
explicit mention from one to the other—nor, for the technical purposes of the theory, does this
seem to do any harm. Mathematically, this distinction can be related to the duality between
points and properties, in the sense of Stone-type dualities: the duality between the points of
a topological space, and its basic “observable properties”—the open sets [76]. The particular
feature of domains which allows this creative ambiguity between points and properties to
be used so freely without incurring any significant conceptual confusions or overheads is that
basic points and basic properties (or observations) are essentially the same things. We explain
this in terms of an example. Consider a finite steam s in Σ∞. On the one hand, this can
be viewed as a point, i.e. as an element of the domain — which may be produced by some
11
system which computes the elements of s in finite time, and then continues to run forever
without producing any more output. On the other hand, we may view this finite stream s as
a property: the property satisfied by any system with output stream t such that s ⊑ t. It is
a finitely observable property, since we can tell whether a system satisfies it after only a finite
time spent observing the system. Whether we take Σ∞ as the space of points X generated
as limits of increasing sequences of finite streams, or as the “logic” (or open-set lattice) L
of properties generated by the basic observations given by finite streams, we get the same
thing: the topology of X will be L, and the space of points generated (as completely prime
filters) over L will be X. This is Stone duality. An extensive development of Stone duality
for Domain Theory has been given in [1]; see also [20, 121, 42].
In fact, we would argue that it is hard to avoid the epistemic stance entirely. For example,
the plausibility of something as basic as the Anti-Symmetry axiom is much greater if we think
in terms of an observer. Much of the conceptual power of Domain Theory comes from the
idea that it articulates how we can approximate infinite ideal objects by processes which use
only finite resources at each finite stage.
Static or Dynamic? Another subtle underlying issue which is not usually made explicit
is that Domain Theory is a static theory resting on dynamic intuitions. Indeed, we have
motivated the theory in terms of certain processes of information increase. Processes happen
in time; thus time is present implicitly in Domain Theory. This underlying temporality can
be developed more explicitly within the Domain Theoretic framework:
• One can add axioms to the basic ones for domains to pick out those domains which are
concrete [79], in the sense that we can understand information increase in terms of a
temporal flow of events. Now the ordering is not simply one of information content,
but involves an idea of causality, so that some events must temporally precede others.
This leads to notions of event structures [107], which have been applied to the study
of concurrent processes. Very similar structures have shown up recently in Theoretical
Physics, in the Causal Sets approach to quantum gravity [116].
• In some remarkable recent work, Domain Theoretic tools are used to characterize glob-
ally hyperbolic space-time manifolds in terms of their causal orderings [96].
However, it should be said that most of the applications of Domain Theory in denotational
semantics are carried out at a much higher level of abstraction, where temporality appears
only in the most residual form. This arises from the fact that computations or programs
are modelled in the Domain-Theoretic denotational framework essentially as functions from
inputs to outputs.
3.1.4 Continuous Functions
We now consider the appropriate notion of function between domains. LetD, E be ω-complete
partial orders. A function f : D → E is monotonic if, for all x, y ∈ D:
x ⊑ y =⇒ f(x) ⊑ f(y).
It is continuous if it is monotonic, and for all ω-chains (xn)n∈ω in D:
f(
⊔
n∈ω
xn) =
⊔
n∈ω
f(xn).
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Examples We consider a number of examples of functions f : Σ∞ → B⊥, where Σ = {0, 1}.
1. f(x) = tt if x contains a 1, f(x) = ⊥ otherwise.
2. f(x) = tt if x contains a 1, f(0∞) = ff, f(x) = ⊥ otherwise.
3. f(x) = tt if x contains a 1, f(x) = ff otherwise.
Of these: (1) is continuous, (2) is monotonic but not continuous, and (3) is not monotonic.
As these examples indicate, the conceptual basis for monotonicity is that the information
in Domain Theory is positive; negative information is not regarded as stable observable in-
formation. That is, if we are at some information state s, then for all we know, s may still
increase to t, where s ⊑ t. This means that if we decide to produce information f(s) at s,
then we must produce all this information, and possibly more, at t, yielding f(s) ⊑ f(t).
Thus we can only make decisions at a given information state which are stable under every
possible information increase from that state. This idea is very much akin to the use of partial
orders in Kripke semantics for Intuitionistic Logic, in particular in connection with the inter-
pretation of negation in that semantics. The continuity condition, on the other hand, reflects
the fact that a computational process will only have access to a finite amount of information
at each finite stage of the computation. If we are provided with an infinite input, then any
information we produce as output at any finite stage can only depend on some finite obser-
vation we have made of the input. This is reflected in one of the inequations corresponding
to continuity:
f(
⊔
n∈ω
xn) ⊑
⊔
n∈ω
f(xn)
which says that the information produced at the limit of an infinite process of information
increase is no more than what can be obtained as the limit of the information produced at
the finite stages of the process. Note that the “other half” of continuity
⊔
n∈ω
f(xn) ⊑ f(
⊔
n∈ω
xn)
follows from monotonicity.
Note by the way how this discussion is permeated with the epistemic stance. Continuous
functions produce points as outputs on the basis of observations they make of their inputs.
Thus the duality between these two points of view plays a basic roˆle in our very understanding
of continuous functions.8 This can be (and often is) glossed over in Domain Theory, by virtue
of the coincidence of finite points and finite properties which we have already discussed.
3.1.5 The Fixpoint Theorem
We now consider a simple but powerful and very widely applicable theorem, which is one of
the main pillars of Domain Theory, since by virtue of this result it provides a general setting
in which recursive definitions can be understood.9
8Mathematically, this duality appears in the guise of the compact-open topology for function spaces. We
can think of open sets in functions spaces as observations which can be made on functions viewed as black
boxes. Dually to the point of view of the function, which observes an input and produces an output, a function
environment must produce an input (a point, or in more general topological situations, a compact set), and
observe the corresponding output.
9A fixed point of a function f : X −→ X is an element x ∈ X such that f(x) = x. “Fixpoint” is (standard)
jargon for fixed point. For some historical information on this theorem and its variations, see [86].
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Theorem 3.1 (The Fixpoint Theorem) Let D be an ω-cpo with a least element, and
f : D → D a continuous function. Then f has a least fixed point lfp(f). Moreover, lfp(f) is
defined explicitly by:
lfp(f) =
⊔
n∈ω
fn(⊥). (1)
We give the proof, since it is elementary, and exhibits very nicely how the basic axiomatic
structure of Domains is used.
Proof Note that fn(⊥) is defined inductively by:
f0(⊥) = ⊥, fk+1(⊥) = f(fk(⊥)).
We show firstly that this sequence is indeed an ω-chain . More precisely, we show for all k ∈ N
that fk(⊥) ⊑ fk+1(⊥). For k = 0, this is just ⊥ ⊑ f(⊥). For the inductive case, assume
that fk(⊥) ⊑ fk+1(⊥). Then by monotonicity of f , f(fk(⊥)) ⊑ f(fk+1(⊥)), i.e. fk+1(⊥) ⊑
fk+2(⊥), as required.
Next we show that (1) does yield a fixpoint. This is a simple calculation using the
continuity of f :
f(
⊔
n∈ω
fn(⊥)) =
⊔
n∈ω
fn+1(⊥) =
⊔
n∈ω
fn(⊥).
The last step uses the (easily verified) fact that removing the first element of an ω-chain does
not change its least upper bound.
Finally, suppose that a is a fixpoint of f . Then we show by induction that, for all k,
fk(⊥) ⊑ a. The basis is just ⊥ ⊑ a. For the inductive step, assume fk(⊥) ⊑ a. Then by
monotonicity of f ,
fk+1(⊥) = f(fk(⊥)) ⊑ f(a) = a.
Thus a is an upper bound of (fn(⊥) | n ∈ ω), and hence
⊔
n∈ω f
n(⊥) ⊑ a. 
Factorial revisited We now reconstrue the definition of the factorial function we considered
previously, as a function on domains:
F : Pfn(N,N) −→ Pfn(N,N),
defined by
F (f)(n) = if n = 0 then 1 else n× f(n− 1).
We can check that F is continuous. Hence we can apply the fixpoint theorem to F , and
conclude that it has a least fixpoint lfp(f), defined explicitly by (1). Now we can make the
(explicit, non-circular) definition:
fact = lfp(F ).
One can check that this definition yields exactly the expected definition of factorial. In fact,
the increasing sequence constructed in forming the least fixpoint according to (1) is exactly
the one we described concretely in our previous discussion of the factorial.
Thus in particular the processes of information increase we have been emphasizing are
involved directly in the construction underpinning the Fixpoint Theorem.
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3.1.6 Further Developments in Domain Theory
This is of course just the beginning of an extensive subject. We mention a few principal
further features of Domain Theory:
Function Spaces A key point of the theory is that, given domains D and E, the set of
continuous functions from D to E, written as [D −→ E], will again be a domain, with
the following pointwise ordering :
f ⊑ g ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ D. f(x) ⊑E g(x).
Moreover, operations such as function application and currying or lambda-abstraction
are continuous. This means that we can form models of typed λ-calculi and higher-order
computation within Domain Theory, which is of central importance for the denotational
semantics of programming languages. Of course, such domains of higher-order functions
are very “abstract”—they are in fact the prime examples of domains which are not
concrete in the sense of [79]—and notions of temporality are left quite far behind.
(There have attempts to capture more of these notions by varying the definition of the
order on function spaces, but these have not been completely successful—and in some
cases, provably cannot be).
Recursive Types Remarkably, the idea of the Fixpoint Theorem, and its use to give mean-
ing to recursive definitions of elements of domains, can be lifted to the level of domains
themselves, to give meaning to recursive definitions of types. This even extends to the
free use of function spaces in recursive definitions of domains, leading to the construc-
tion of domains D whose continuous function spaces [D −→ D] are isomorphic to D
or to a subspace of D. This allows models of the type-free λ-calculus, and of various
strongly impredicative type theories, to be given within Domain Theory.
Powerdomains There are also a number of powerdomain constructions P (D), which build a
domain of subsets of D. This allows various forms of non-deterministic and concurrent
computation to be described. There is also a probabilistic powerdomain construction,
which provides semantics for probabilistic computation.
Some suggestions for further reading on Domain Theory The text [50] gives a
fairly gentle introduction to partial orders and lattices, with some material on domains. The
Handbook article [20] is a comprehensive technical survey of domain theory. The monograph
[57] focusses on the connections to topology and lattice theory. Gordon Plotkin’s classic
lecture notes [109] are available on-line. The texts [120, 27] show how domain theory is used
in the semantics of programming languages.
3.2 Dynamic Logic
Dynamic Logic originates at the confluence of two sources: modal logic and its Kripke se-
mantics [80, 41]; and Hoare logic of programs [71].
Modal Logic Modal Logic adds to a standard background logic (say classical propositional
calculus) the propositional operators ✷ and ✸, expressing ideas of “necessity” and “possibil-
ity”. This was transformed from a philosophical curiosity to a vibrant and highly applicable
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branch of mathematical logic by the introduction of Kripke semantics [80]. This is based on
Kripke structures (W,R, V ), where W is a set of worlds, R ⊆ W ×W is an “accessibility
relation”, and V : P → P(W ) is a valuation which for each propositional atom in P assigns
the set of worlds in which it is true. This valuation is then extended to one on formulas, with
the key clauses:
w |= ✷φ ≡ ∀w′. wRw′ ⇒ w′ |= φ
w |= ✸φ ≡ ∃w′. wRw′ ∧ w′ |= φ.
The importance of the Kripke semantics is that it gives modal logic a clear mathematical
purpose: it is a logical language for talking about such structures, which strikes a good
balance between expressive power and tractability. Computer Science provides a wealth of
situations where such structures arise naturally, and where there is a clear need for the
verification of their logical properties. The dominant interpretation of Kripke structures
in Computer Science replaces metaphysical talk of “possible worlds” by the more prosaic
terminology of states. Here we think of states of a system, which are generally characterized
by the information we have about them. In a Kripke structure, the direct information we
have about a state is which atomic propositions are true in that state. However, while we
seem again to be speaking about information states, as in our discussion of Domain Theory,
there is an important difference. In Domain Theory, (as in Kripke semantics for Intuitionistic
Logic), information is in general partial, but also persistent. Information can only increase
along a computation. We may never reach total information, but we will never lose what
we had—just as we can never (in current Physics) change the past. (Indeed, the two are
intimately related. In the implicit temporality of Domain Theory, the current information
state summarizes all the information produced in the computation up till now; whatever
happens in the future cannot change that). By contrast, Kripke structures for modal logics
correspond to a less stable world. We may have perfect knowledge of the current state, but
the dynamics of the system, as described by the accessibility relation, allow in general for
arbitrary state change. A basic Computer Science model for this scenario is provided by
taking the states to be memory states of a computer. At some instant of time we may have
a complete snap-shot of the memory. But our repertoire of actions allow us to assign an
arbitrary new value into any memory cell, so we can go from any given state to any other
(possibly by a sequence of basic actions). In particular, the key feature of computer memory,
the fact that we can destructively over-write the previous contents of a memory cell, (a feature
which is not, apparently, available for our own memories!), ensures that the past is not in
general carried forward.
Hoare Logic Hoare Logic [71, 31] provides a compositional proof theory for reasoning
about imperative programs. It is a two-sorted system. We have a syntax for programs P ,
and one for formulas φ, which are generally taken to be formulas of predicate calculus. Such
formulas can be used to express properties of program states (i.e. memory state snap-shots as
in our previous discussion, or more formally assignments of values to the variables appearing
in the program), by a variable pun by which the individual variables used in formulas are
identified with the program variables. The basic assertions of the system are taken to be
Hoare triples φ{P}ψ. Such a triple is said to be valid if, in any initial state satisfying the
formula φ (the precondition), execution of the program P will, if it terminates, result in a
final state satisfying the formula ψ (the post-condition).
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The variable pun is put to use in the axiom for assignment statements:
φ[e/x]{x := e}φ
which says that φ is true after executing the assignment statement x := e if φ with e substi-
tuted for x was true before.
The key rules of the system allow for compositional derivation of assertions about complex
programs from assertions about their immediate sub-programs.
φ{P}ψ ψ{Q}θ
φ{P ;Q}θ
φ ∧B{P}ψ φ ∧ ¬B{Q}ψ
φ{if B then P else Q}ψ
φ ∧B{P}φ
φ{while B do P}φ ∧ ¬B
Here P ;Q is the sequential composition which firstly performs P , then Q; if B then P else Q
is the conditional which evaluates B in the current state; if it is true then P is performed,
while if it is false, Q is performed. Finally, while B do P evaluates B; if it is true, then P
is performed, after which the whole statement is repeated; while if it is false, the statement
terminates immediately.
Dynamic Logic Dynamic Logic [111] arises by combining salient features of these two
systems. Note that we are reasoning about programs in terms of the input-output relations
on states which they define. If the program is deterministic, this relation will actually be
a partial function, but there is no need to insist on this. We can thus view each program
P as defining a relation R ⊆ S × S, where S is the set of states. Thus for each individual
program, we obtain a Kripke structure (S,R, V ), where V is the valuation which assigns truth
conditions on states for some repertoire of state predicates. The key point of contact between
the two systems is that validity of the Hoare triple φ{P}ψ corresponds exactly to the validity
of the modal formula
φ→ ✷ψ
in the Kripke structure (S,R, V ), where by validity we mean that
s |= φ→ ✷ψ
for every s ∈ S.
As a first extension, we can consider multiple programs, each defining an accessibility
relation R. To keep track of which program we are talking about at any given point, we
replace ✷ by [R], so that the formula corresponding to the Hoare triple now reads as
φ→ [R]ψ.
Just as [R] replaces ✷, so 〈R〉 replaces ✸. Thinking of R as the input-output relation defined
by a program, we can read [R]φ as holding in all states (worlds) s such that any output state
obtained by executing R starting in s will satisfy φ. Similarly, 〈R〉 will be true in any state s
such that there is some output state than can be obtained by running R starting in s which
satisfies φ.
This is justmulti-modal logic, with mutiple accessibility relations, each with its own modal-
ities. Note that it is now completely meaningful to consider modal formulas which make
assertions about programs which go well beyond Hoare triples, e.g.
[R]〈S〉φ→ 〈S〉[R]φ.
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However, at this point we lack the compositional analysis of programs offered by Hoare Logic.
The final step to (propositional) Dynamic Logic comes by considering a two-sorted system
with a mutually recursive syntax. We have a set P of propositional atoms as before, and also
a set Rel of basic relations. The syntax of formulas is given by
φ ::= p ∈ P | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | [R]φ
while the syntax of relations R is given by
R ::= r ∈ Rel | R;S | R ∪ S | R∗ | φ?
We have not included the modal operator 〈R〉 as primitive syntax, since we can define
〈R〉φ ≡ ¬[R]¬φ.
In this syntax, any program is allowed to appear as a modal operator on formulas, while
in addition to the usual regular operations of relational algebra (composition, union, and
reflexive transitive closure), any formula is allowed to appeared as a program test (we may
call this the formula pun). In general, this is too strong, and only a restricted class of tests
should be allowed. Tests are interpreted as sub-identity relations—so φ? is the set of all (s, s)
such that φ is true in s.
Note that the usual imperative program constructs can be recovered from these relational
constructs. Sequential composition is provided directly, while
if b then R else S ≡ b;R ∪ ¬b;S while b do R ≡ (b;R)∗;¬b.
The Hoare Logic axioms can now be derived from the following modal axioms:
[R;S]φ ↔ [R][S]φ
[R ∪ S]φ ↔ [R]φ ∧ [S]φ
[ψ?]φ ↔ ψ → φ
and the rule
φ→ [R]φ
φ→ [R∗]φ
.
3.2.1 Discussion
While Hoare Logic is specifically tailored to the needs of conventional imperative programming
languages, Dynamic Logic is much more generic in style; and indeed, it has been applied in
a range of contexts, including Natural Language and Quantum Logic. In the Chapter in this
Handbook by Baltag and Moss, a version of Dynamic Logic is described in which the states
are information states of agents, and the actions are epistemic actions by these agents, such
as public announcements.
As a general formalism, though, Dynamic Logic offers only a limited analysis of informa-
tion dynamics. Indeed, despite its name, it is not really very dynamic, as it is limited to
speaking of the input-output behaviour of relations. This is confirmed by the simple trans-
lation it admits into first-order logic (augmented with fixpoints to account for the reflexive
transitive closure operation on relations). We briefly sketch this. To each relation term R, we
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associate a formula BR(x, y) in two free variables, and to each modal formula φ we associate
a formula Aφ(x) in one free variable. The main clauses in the definition of BR are as follows:
BR∪S(x, y) ≡ BR(x, y) ∨ BS(x, y)
BR;S(x, y) ≡ ∃z.BR(x, z) ∧ BS(z, y)
Bφ?(x, y) ≡ Aφ(x) ∧ x = y
BR∗(x, y) ≡ µS. [(x = y) ∨ (∃z.BR(x, z) ∧ S(z, y))]
The clauses for modal formulas are standard. The one for the modality is:
A[R]φ(x) ≡ ∀y.BR(x, y)→ Aφ(y).
Suggestion for further reading The book [66] is a comprehensive technical reference,
while [36] is a wide-ranging study. Applications to Natural Language appear in [65, 53], and
to Quantum Logic in [32].
3.3 Process Algebra
3.3.1 Background
One of the major areas of activity in Theoretical Computer Science over the past three
decades has been Concurrency Theory, and in particular Process Algebra. Whereas modelling
sequential computation in terms of input-output functions or relations essentially uses off-the-
shelf tools from Discrete Mathematics and Logic, albeit in novel combinations and with new
technical twists, and even Domain Theory can be seen as an off-shoot of General Topology and
Lattice Theory, Concurrency Theory has really opened up some new territory. In Concurrency
Theory, the computational processes themselves become the objects of study; concurrent
systems are executed for the behaviour they produce, rather than to compute some pre-
specified function. In this setting, even such corner-stones of computation as Turing’s analysis
of computability do not provide all the answers. For all its conceptual depth, Turing’s analysis
of computability was still calibrated using familiar mathematical objects: which functions or
numbers are computable? When we enter the vast range of possibilities for the behaviour of
computational systems in general, the whole issue of what it means for a concurrent formalism
to be expressively complete must be re-examined. There is in fact no generally accepted form
of Church-Turing thesis for concurrency; and no widely accepted candidate for a universally
expressive formalism. Instead, there are a huge range of concurrency formalisms, embodying
a host of computational features.
Another question which ramifies alarmingly in this context is what is the right notion
of behavioural equivalence of processes. Again, a large number of candidates have arisen.
Experts use what seems most appropriate for their purpose; it is not even plausible that a
single notion will gain general acceptance as “the right one”.
In fact, a great deal of progress has been achieved, and the situation is much more positive
than might appear from these remarks. There is a great diversity of particular formalisms
and definitions in Concurrency Theory; but underpinning these are a much smaller num-
ber of underlying paradigms and technical tool-kits, which do provide effective intellectual
instruments, both for fundamental research and applications.
Examples include:
• labelled transition systems and bisimulation
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• naming and scope restriction and extrusion
• the automata-theoretic paradigm for model-checking
These tool-kits are the real fruits of these theories. They may be compared to the traditional
tool-kits of physics and engineering: Differential Equations, Laplace and Fourier Transforms,
Numerical Linear Algebra, etc. They can be applied to a wide range of situations, going
well beyond those originally envisaged, e.g. Security, Computational Biology, and Quantum
Computation.
3.3.2 Some Basics of Process Algebra
We now turn to a brief description of a few basic notions, in a subject on which there is a vast
literature. We begin with the key semantic structure, namely labelled transition systems. A
labelled transition system is a structure (S,Act, T ), where S is a set of states, Act is a set of
actions, and T ⊆ S×Act×S is the transition relation. We write s
a
−→ t for (s, a, t) ∈ T . Note
how close this is to the notion of Kripke structure we have already encountered. However, that
notion is tuned to a state-based view of computation, in which we focus on assertions which are
true in given states. The transition relation plays an indirect roˆle, in controlling the behaviour
of the modal operators. By contrast, the point of view in labelled transition systems is that
states are not directly observable, and hence do not have properties directly attributable to
them. Rather, it is the actions which are the basic observables, and we infer information about
states indirectly from their potential for observable behaviour. Thus the point of view here is
closer to automata theory. A key difference from classical automata theory, however, is that
we look beyond the classical notion of behaviour in terms of the words or traces (sequences of
actions) accepted or generated by the system, and also encompass branching behaviour. The
classical example which illustrates this is the following [98]:
•
•
a
❄
•
✛
b
•
c
✲
6∼
•
•
✛
a
•
a
✲
•
b
❄
•
c
❄
These systems have the same linear traces {ab, ac}. However, if we think of a scenario where
we can perform experiments by pressing buttons labelled with the various actions, and observe
if the experiments succeed, i.e. whether the system performs the corresponding action, then
after observing an a in the first system, it is clear that whether we press the b button or the
c button, we will succeed; whereas in the second system, one button will succeed and the
other won’t. A fundamental notion of process equivalence which enforces this distinction is
bisimulation. We define a bisimulation [35, 68, 108, 99, 112] on a labelled transition system
(S,Act, T ) to be a relation R ⊆ S × S such that:
sRt ∧ s
a
−→ s′ ⇒ ∃t′. t
a
−→ t′ ∧ s′Rt′
∧
sRt ∧ t
a
−→ t′ ⇒ ∃s′. s
a
−→ s′ ∧ s′Rt′
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We write s ∼ t if there is a bisimulation R such that sRt. We can see that indeed the root
states of the two trees in the above example are not bisimilar, since the first has an action a
to a state in which both the actions b and c are possible, while the second has no a-move to
a matching state.
We now turn to a suitable modal logic for labelled transition systems. The basic form for
such a logic is Hennessy-Milner Logic. This has modal operators [a], 〈a〉 for each action a. In
general, this logic does not have (or require) any propositional atoms; just constants tt (true)
and ff (false). The semantic clauses are as expected for a multi-modal logic, where we view
the transition relation as an Act-indexed family of relations {Ta}a∈Act, where Ta ⊆ S × S is
defined by
Ta = {(s, t) | (s, a, t) ∈ T}.
Thus we have the clauses
s |= [a]φ ≡ ∀t. s
a
−→ t ⇒ t |= φ
s |= 〈a〉φ ≡ ∃t. s
a
−→ t ∧ t |= φ.
The basic result here is that, under suitable hypotheses, two states in a labelled transition
system are bisimilar if and only if they satisfy the same formulas in this modal logic. Thus in
our example above, the first system satisfies the formula 〈a〉(〈b〉tt ∧ 〈c〉tt), while the second
does not.
We now turn, finally, to the algebraic aspect of process algebra. Just as we structured
the programs in Dynamic Logic using relational algebra, so we seek an algebraic structure
to generate a wide class of process behaviours. As we have already discussed, there is no
one universally adopted set of process combinators, but we shall consider a standard set of
operations, essentially a fragment of Milner’s CCS [98, 99]. The syntax of process terms P is
defined, assuming a set Act of actions, as follows:
P ::= a.P (a ∈ Act) | P +Q | 0 | P ‖ Q.
Here a.P is action prefixing ; first do a, then behave as P . P +Q is non-deterministic choice
between P and A, while 0 is inaction; the process which can do nothing. Finally, P ‖ Q
is parallel composition, which we take here in a simple form, not involving any interaction
between P and Q.
We formalize these intuitions as a labelled transition system in which the states are the
process terms, while the transition relation is defined by structural induction on the syntax
of terms—the Structural Operational Semantics paradigm [110].
The transition relation is specified as follows.
a.P
a
−→ P
P
a
−→ P ′
P +Q
a
−→ P ′
Q
a
−→ Q′
P +Q
a
−→ Q′
P
a
−→ P ′
P ‖ Q
a
−→ P ′ ‖ Q
Q
a
−→ Q′
P ‖ Q
a
−→ P ‖ Q′
This labelled transition system gives rise to a notion of bisimulation, which is an equivalence
relation, and in fact a congruence for the process algebra. The corresponding equational
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theory for the algebra can be axiomatized as follows:
P + P = P
P + 0 = 0
P +Q = Q+ P
P + (Q+R) = (P +Q) +R
together with the following equational scheme. If P ≡
∑
i∈I ai.Pi and Q ≡
∑
j∈J bj .Qj , then:
P ‖ Q =
∑
i∈I
ai.(Pi ‖ Q) +
∑
j∈J
bj .(P ‖ Qj).
This is an infinite family of equations. In fact, the equational theory of bisimulation on process
terms is not finitely axiomatizable [105]; however, with the aid of an auxiliary operator (the
“left merge”), a finite axiomatization can be achieved [104].
3.3.3 Communication and Interaction in Process Algebra
We shall take a brief glimpse at this large topic. For illustration, we shall describe the CCS
approach [98]. However, it should be emphasized that there is a huge diversity of approaches
in the process algebra literature, with none having a clear claim to being considered canonical.
(For further remarks on this issue of non-canonicity, see the final section of this article, and
[6]).
We assume some structure on the set A: a fixed-point free involution a 7→ a¯, so that
we have a 6= a¯ and a¯ = a. The idea is that a and a¯ will be complementary partners to an
interaction or synchronized action. We also introduce a special action τ , which is intended to
be a “silent action”, unobservable to the external environment.
We can now introduce a parallel composition P |Q which does allow for interaction, in
the form of synchronization between P and Q. Its dynamics are given by the following rules:
P
a
−→ P ′
P |Q
a
−→ P ′ |Q
P
a
−→ P ′ Q
a¯
−→ Q′
P |Q
τ
−→ P ′ |Q′
(a, a¯ 6= τ)
Q
a
−→ Q′
P |Q
a
−→ P |Q′
The new ingredient is the middle rule, which allows for synchronization between P and Q.
Note that a and a¯ “complete” each other into the action τ which is now an internal step of
the system, and hence unobservable to the external environment.
To take proper account of the unobservable character of τ , we introduce the observable
transition relation for each a 6= τ :
a
=⇒ =
τ
−→
∗ a
−→
τ
−→
∗
We can then define weak bisimulation with respect to these observable transitions. However,
a new complication arises: this weak bisimulation is not a congruence with respect to the
operations of the process algebra. It is necessary to take the largest congruence compatible
with weak bisimulation, finally yielding the notion of observational congruence. This notion
can be equationally axiomatized, but it is considerably more complex and less intuitive than
the “strong bisimulation” we encountered previously.
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3.3.4 Discussion
Process Algebra can be used as a vehicle for discussions of information flow and information
dynamics, e.g. [88]. It does not in itself offer a fully fledged theory of these notions.
Process Algebra is a qualitative theory of process behaviours. It is our first example of a
dynamic theory, since it makes temporality and the flow of events explicit.
Suggestions for further reading Introductory textbooks include [72, 99, 30, 101]. The
Handbook of Process Algebra [37] provides wide technical coverage of the field.
4 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Theories of Infor-
mation
4.1 Scott domain theory and Shannon information theory
Two important theories of information give contrasting views on the question of information
increase, which we discussed in Section 1. Information theory a` la Shannon is a quantitative
theory which considers how given information can be transmitted losslessly on noisy channels.
In this process, information may only be lost, never increased. Domain Theory a` la Scott is,
as we have seen, a qualitative theory in which the key notion is the partial order x ⊑ y, which
can be interpreted as: “y has more information content than x”. This theory is able to model
a wide range of computational phenomena. To take a classical example, consider the interval
bisection methods for finding the root of a function. We start with an interval in which the
root is known to lie. At each step, we halve the length of the interval being considered. This
represents an increase in our information about the location of the root, in an entirely natural
sense. In the limit, this nested sequence of intervals contains a single point, the root – we
have perfect information about the solution.
More generally, in Domain Theory recursion (and thereby control mechanisms such as
iteration) is modelled as the least fixed point of a monotonic and (order-)continuous function:
⊥ ⊑ f⊥ ⊑ f2⊥ ⊑ · · ·
⊔
k
fk⊥
since f(
⊔
k f
k⊥) =
⊔
k f
k+1⊥ =
⊔
k f
k⊥. Thus a basic tenet of this theory is that information
does increase during computation, and in particular this is how the meaning of recursive
definitions is given.
It is intriguing to consider that the different viewpoints taken by Information theory
and Domain Theory may have been influenced by their technological roots. Information
theory was summoned forth by the needs of the telecommunications industry, whose task
is to transmit the customer’s data with the highest possible fidelity. Domain Theory arose
as a mathematical theory of computation; the task of computation is to “add value” to the
customer’s data.10
How can these views be reconciled? Information theory is a thermodynamic theory;
Shannon information is negative entropy. From this viewpoint, the total information of a
10Which of course raises our question of how this can be possible thermodynamically. The answer is, again,
that it is the customer’s data which is having value added to it; just as buying energy from the National Grid
does not violate the Second Law.
23
system can only decrease; however, information can flow from one subsystem into another,
just as a body can be warmed by transferring heat from its environment.
The Domain Theory view, we suggest, arises most naturally if we think of adding an
observer to a system. It is the observer’s information which increases during a computation.
This reading has a precise mathematical analogue in the view of Domain Theory as a “logic
of observable properties” [1]. Information increase is always, necessarily it seems, relative to
a sub-system. Moreover, this is a subsystem which can observe its environment, and which
may, symmetrically, act itself to direct information to the environment. It is then a small
step to viewing such sub-systems as agents.
It is worth adding that Shannon Information Theory also relies on such a view for its
guiding intuitions. One of the standard ways of motivating Shannon information is in terms
of “twenty questions”: the number of bits of information in a message is how many yes/no
questions we would need to have answered in order to know the contents of the message.
Again, implicit here is some interaction between agents. And of course, the purpose of
communication itself is to transfer information from one agent to another.
We need a quantitative theory to deal with essentially quantitative issues such as com-
plexity, information content, rate of information flow etc. However, the weakness of a purely
quantitative theory is that numbers are always comparable, so that some more subtle issues
are obscured, such as, crucially, distinguishing different directions of information increase. Be-
yond this, by combining quantitative and qualitative aspects, e.g. in formulating conditions
on “informatic processes”, a unified theory can be more than the sum of its parts.
4.2 Domains with measurements: connecting the quantitative and quali-
tative views
An important step towards unifying the qualitative and the quantitative points of view was
taken in Keye Martin’s Ph.D. thesis [91] and subsequent publications [92, 93, 95]. Martin
introduced a simple notion of measurement on domains. In its most concrete form, a mea-
surement assigns real numbers to domain elements, which can be said to measure the degree
of undefinedness or uncertainty of the element. Thus the maximal elements, which can be
regarded as having perfect information, will have measurement 0. The axioms for measure-
ments, while quite simple and intuitive, tie the quantitative notion in with the qualitative
domain structure in a very rich way. Just to mention some of the highlights:
• There is a rich theory of fixpoints which applies to increasing, but not necessarily mono-
tonic, functions on domains. This is already a remarkable departure from ‘classical’
domain theory, in which monotonicity is always assumed. However, Martin shows that
there are compelling natural examples, such as interval bisection, which require this
broader framework. Not only are there existence and uniqueness theorems for fixpoints
in this frameworks, but also novel induction principles.
• As the previous point suggests, there is a move away from the use of domain theory
to model purely extensional aspects of computation, and towards using it to capture
important features of computational processes. This leads to a notion of ‘informatic
derivative’ which can be used to gain information about the rate of convergence of a
computational process.
• A notable aspect of this development is the unified basis on which it puts the study of
both discrete and continuous (e.g. real-number) computation.
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It is also important that there are many natural examples of measurement covering most
of the domains standardly arising as data-types for computation, including the domain of
intervals, for which the natural measurement is the length of the interval; finite lists and
other standard finite data-structures; streams; partial functions on the natural numbers; and
both non-deterministic and probabilistic powerdomains.
However, the example which has really revealed the possibilities of this framework has
only appeared recently, and is a major development in its own right.
4.3 Combining Scott Information and Shannon Information
Recently, Bob Coecke and Keye Martin have produced a very interesting construction which
can be seen as a first step towards a unification of these two theories of information [45]. The
problem which they attacked can be formulated as follows. Consider the set of probability
distributions on a finite set. For an n-element set, these are the “classical n-states” of Physics:
∆n := {x ∈ [0, 1]n :
n∑
i=1
xi = 1}.
This is the setting in which Shannon entropy, the fundamental quantitative notion in classical
Information Theory, is defined. It assigns a number, the “expected information”, to each
classical state. The question is: can we place a partial order on ∆n such that:
1. This partial order forms a domain.
2. Shannon entropy is a measurement with respect to this domain.
3. The order extends to quantum states (density operators).
These are highly non-trivial requirements to satisfy. Note that the set of probability distri-
butions on a 3-element set, seen as a subset of Euclidean space, form a (solid) triangle, and
in general those on a n-element set form an n-simplex. The distribution corresponding to
maximum uncertainty is the uniform distribution, with each point assigned probability 1/n
— geometrically, the barycenter of the simplex; while the maximal elements max(∆n), corre-
sponding to perfect information, are the pure states assigning probability 1 to one element,
and 0 to all others — geometrically, the vertices of the simplex. This geometrical aspect brings
a rich mathematical structure to this example which seems different to anything previously
encountered in Domain Theory.
Note also the contrast with previous work on the probabilistic powerdomain [77]. Clas-
sical probability distributions are maximal elements in the probabilistic powerdomain; non-
standard elements (valuations) are introduced which provide approximations to measures,
but the order restricted to the measures themselves is discrete. By contrast, we are seeking a
rich informatic structure on the standard objects of probability (distributions) and quantum
mechanics (density operators) themselves, without introducing any non-standard elements. It
is by no means a priori obvious that this can be done at all; once we see that it can, many
new possibilities will unfold.
A classical state x ∈ ∆n is pure when xi = 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; we denote such a
state by ei. Pure states {ei}i are the actual states a system can be in, while general mixed
states x and y are epistemic entities.
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If we know x ∈ ∆n+1 and by some means determine that outcome i is not possible, our
knowledge improves to
pi(x) =
1
1− xi
(x1, . . . , xˆi, . . . , xn+1) ∈ ∆
n,
where pi(x) is obtained by first removing xi from x and then renormalizing. The partial
mappings which result,
pi : ∆
n+1 ⇀ ∆n
with dom(pi) = ∆
n+1 \ {ei}, are called the Bayesian projections and lead one directly to the
following inductively defined relation on classical states.
Definition 4.1 For x, y ∈ ∆2:
x ⊑ y ≡ (y1 ≤ x1 ≤ 1/2) or (1/2 ≤ x1 ≤ y1) . (2)
For n ≥ 2, and x, y ∈ ∆n+1:
x ⊑ y ≡ (∀i)(x, y ∈ dom(pi)⇒ pi(x) ⊑ pi(y)). (3)
The relation ⊑ on ∆n is called the Bayesian order.
See [45] for motivation, and results showing that the order on ∆2 is uniquely determined
under minimal assumptions.
The key result is:
Theorem 4.2 (∆n,⊑) is a domain with maximal elements
max(∆n) = {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
and least element ⊥ := (1/n, . . . , 1/n). Moreover, Shannon entropy
µ(x) = −
n∑
i=1
xi log xi
is a measurement of type ∆n → [0,∞)∗.
The Bayesian order can also be described in a more direct manner, the symmetric char-
acterization. Let S(n) denote the group of permutations on {1, . . . , n}, and
Λn := {x ∈ ∆n : (∀i < n)xi ≥ xi+1}
the collection of monotone classical states.
Theorem 4.3 For x, y ∈ ∆n, we have x ⊑ y iff there is a permutation σ ∈ S(n) such that
x · σ, y · σ ∈ Λn and
(x · σ)i(y · σ)i+1 ≤ (x · σ)i+1(y · σ)i
for all i with 1 ≤ i < n.
In words, this result says that the Bayesian order holds between states x and y if we can find
a permutation σ which rearranges them both as monotone states, and such that x falls less
rapidly than y as we proceed through the ordered list of component probabilities.
Thus, the Bayesian order is order isomorphic to n! many copies of Λn identified along
their common boundaries. This fact, together with the pictures of ↑x := {y ∈ ∆n | x ⊑ y} at
representative states x in Figure 1, will give the reader a good feel for the geometric nature
of the Bayesian order.
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Figure 1: Pictures of ↑x for x ∈ ∆3.
4.4 The Quantum Case
The real force of the construction for classical states becomes apparent in the further devel-
opment in [45], to show that it can be lifted to analogous constructions for quantum states.
Here, rather than probability distributions on finite sets, one is looking at mixed states on
finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Let Hn denote an n-dimensional complex Hilbert space. A
quantum state is a density operator ρ : Hn →Hn, i.e., a self-adjoint, positive, linear operator
with tr(ρ) = 1. The quantum states on Hn are denoted Ωn. A quantum state ρ on Hn is pure
if
spec(ρ) ⊆ {0, 1}.
The set of pure states is denoted Σn. They are in bijective correspondence with the one-
dimensional subspaces of Hn. Classical states are distributions on the set of pure states
max(∆n). By Gleason’s theorem [64], an analogous result holds for quantum states: Density
operators encode distributions on Σn.11
If our knowledge about the state of a system is represented by density operator ρ, then
quantum mechanics predicts the probability that a measurement of observable e yields the
value λ ∈ spec(e). It is
pr(ρ→ eλ) := tr(p
λ
e · ρ),
where pλe is the projection corresponding to eigenvalue λ and eλ is its associated eigenspace
in the spectral representation of e.
Let e be an observable on Hn with spec(e) = {1, . . . , n}. For a quantum state ρ in Ωn,
spec(ρ|e) := (pr(ρ→ e1), . . . ,pr(ρ→ en)) ∈ ∆
n.
So what does it mean to say that we have more information about the system when we
have σ ∈ Ωn than when we have ρ ∈ Ωn? It means that there is an observable e such
that (a) the meaurement of e serves as a physical realization of the knowledge each state
imparts to us, and (b) we have a better chance of predicting the result of the measurement
of e in state σ than we do in state ρ. Formally, (a) means that spec(ρ) = Im(spec(ρ|e))
and spec(σ) = Im(spec(σ|e)) (where the image Im simply converts a list to the underlying
set), which is equivalent to requiring [ρ, e] = 0 and [σ, e] = 0, where [a, b] = ab − ba is the
commutator of operators.
Definition 4.4 Let n ≥ 2. For quantum states ρ, σ ∈ Ωn, we have ρ ⊑ σ iff there is an
observable e : Hn →Hn such that [ρ, e] = [σ, e] = 0 and spec(ρ|e) ⊑ spec(σ|e) in ∆n.
11Of course, Gleason’s theorem also applies to separable infinite-dimensional spaces.
27
Taking this definition together with our reading of the Bayesian order on classical states, we
capture the idea of being able to predict the result of an experiment more confidently on σ
than on ρ in terms of the less rapid falling off of the values of spec(ρ|e)i than of spec(σ|e)i.
Theorem 4.5 (Ωn,⊑) is a domain with maximal elements
max(Ωn) = Σn
and least element ⊥ = I/n, where I is the identity matrix. Moreover, von Neumann entropy
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ)
is a measurement of type Ωn → [0,∞)∗.
This order can be characterized in a similar fashion to the Bayesian order on ∆n, in terms
of symmetries and projections. In its symmetric formulation, unitary operators on Hn take
the place of permutations on {1, . . . , n}, while the projective formulation of (Ωn,⊑) shows
that each classical projection pi : ∆
n+1 ⇀ ∆n is actually the restriction of a special quantum
projection Ωn+1 ⇀ Ωn.
4.5 The Logics of Birkhoff and von Neumann
Quantum Logic in the sense of Birkhoff and von Neumann [38] consists of the propositions one
can make about a physical system. Each proposition takes the form “The value of observable
e is contained in E ⊆ spec(e).” For classical systems, the logic is P{1, . . . , n}, while for
quantum systems it is Ln, the lattice of (closed) subspaces of Hn. In each case, implication
of propositions is captured by inclusion, and a fundamental distinction between classical
and quantum — that there are pairs of quantum observables whose exact values cannot be
simultaneously measured at a single moment in time — finds lattice theoretic expression:
P{1, . . . , n} is distributive; Ln is not.
The classical and quantum logics can be derived from the Bayesian and spectral orders
using the same order theoretic construction.
Definition 4.6 An element x of a dcpo D is irreducible when
∧
(↑x ∩max(D)) = x
The set of irreducible elements in D is written Ir(D).
The order dual of a poset (D,⊑D) is written D
∗; its order is x ⊑ y ⇔ y ⊑D x.
The following result is proved in [44].
Theorem 4.7 For n ≥ 2, the classical lattices arise as
Ir(∆n)∗ ≃ P{1, . . . , n} \ {∅},
and the quantum lattices arise as
Ir(Ωn)∗ ≃ Ln \ {0}.
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Figure 2: The irreducibles of ∆3 with the corresponding Hasse diagram.
4.6 Discussion
The foregoing development has been quite technical, but the underlying programme which
these ideas illustrate has a clear conceptual interest. The broad agenda of developing a unified
quantitative/qualitative theory of information, applicable to a wide range of situations in logic
and computation, is highly attractive, and likely to lead to new perspectives on information
in general.
Our discussion thus far has largely been couched in terms of static theories, although
we have already hinted at the importance of agents and explicit dynamics. We now turn to
interactive models of logic and computation.
5 Games, Logical Equilibria and Conservation of Information
Flow
In this Section and the next, we shall discuss some dynamical theories of computation which
are explicitly based on interaction between agents, and which expose a structure of informa-
tion flow which is both geometrical and logical in character. These theories, which go under
the names of Game Semantics and Geometry of Interaction, have played a considerable roˆle
in recent work on the semantics both of programming languages, and of logical proofs.
5.1 Changing Views of Computation
To set the scene, we begin by recalling how perspectives on computation have changed since
the first computers appeared. The early practice of computing can be pictured as in Figure
3. This is the era of stand-alone machines and programs: computers are served by an elite
priesthood, and have only a narrow input-output interface with the rest of the world.
First-generation models of computation Given this limited vision of computing, there
is a very natural abstraction of computation, in which programs are seen as computing func-
tions or relations from inputs to outputs.12
12This is the exactly the point of view on which, as we have seen, program logics such as Hoare Logic and
Dynamic Logic are based.
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Figure 3: Computing “in the isolation ward”.
Computation
Input Data Output
These models live on the existing intellectual inheritance from discrete mathematics and logic.
Time and processes lurk in the background, but are largely suppressed.
Computation in the Age of the Internet As we know, the technology has changed
dramatically. Even a conventional Distributed Systems picture, as illustrated in Figure 4,
which has been common-place for the last 20 years, tells a very different story. We have
witnessed the progression
multitasking → distributed systems → Internet → “mobile” and “global” computing
Key features of this unfolding new computational universe include: agents interacting with
each other, and information flowing around the system.
The insufficiency of the first-generation models of computation for this new computational
environment is evident. The old concepts fail to match the modern world of computing and
its concerns:
Robustness in the presence of failures.
Atomicity of transactions.
Security of information flows.
Quality of user interface.
Quantitative aspects.
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Figure 4: Distributed Computing
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Processes vs. Products We see a shift in emphasis and importance between How we
compute vs. What we compute. Processes were in the background, but now come to the fore:
the “how” becomes the new “what”.
This leads ineluctably to the need for Second-generation models of computation, and
in particular Process Models such as Petri nets, Process Algebra, etc. Whereas 1st-generation
models lived off the intellectual inheritance from mathematics and logic, there is no adequate
pre-existing theory of processes or agents, interaction, and information flow, as we see by
considering the following questions (which have already been mentioned in Section 1):
• What is computed?
• What is a process?
• What are the analogues to Turing-completeness, universality?
There are indeed a plethora of models, but no definitive conceptual analysis, comparable to
Turing’s analysis of computation in its “classical” sense: not least, perhaps, because it is
indeed a harder problem!
5.2 Some New Perspectives
Instead of isolated systems, with rudimentary interactions with their environment, the stan-
dard unit of description or design becomes a process or agent, the essence of whose behaviour
is how it interacts with its environment.
Who is the System? Who is the Environment? This depends on point of view. We may
designate some agent or group of agents as the System currently under consideration, with
everything else as the Environment; but it is always possible to contemplate a roˆle interchange,
in which the Environment becomes the System and vice versa. (This is, of course, one of the
great devices, and imaginative functions, of creative literature). This symmetry between
System and Environment carries a first clue that there is some structure here; it will lead us
to a key duality, and a deep connection to logic.
5.3 Interaction
Complex behaviour arises as the global effect of a system of interacting agents (or processes).
The key building block is the agent. The key operation is interaction – plugging agents
together so that they interact with each other
32
This conceptual model works at all “scales” :
• Macro-scale: processes in operating systems, software agents on the Internet, transac-
tions.
• Micro-scale: how programs are implemented (subroutine call-return protocols, register
transfer) all the way down into hardware.
It is applicable both to design (synthesis) and to description (analysis); to artificial and to
natural information-processing systems.
There are of course large issues lurking here, e.g. in the realm of “Complex Systems”:
emergent behaviour and even intelligence. Is is helpful, or even feasible, to understand this
complexity compositionally? We need new conceptual tools, new theories, to help us analyze
and synthesize these systems, to help us to understand and to build.
5.4 Towards a “Logic of Interaction”
Specifying and reasoning about the behaviour of computer programs takes us into the realm
of logic. For the first-generation models, logic could be taken “as it was”—static and time-
less. For our second-generation models, getting an adequate account—a genuine “logic of
interaction”—may require a fundamental reconceptualization of logic itself. This radical re-
vision of our view of logic is happening anyway—prompted partly by the applications, and
partly by ideas arising within logic.
5.4.1 The Static Conception of Logic
We provide an unfair caricature of the standard logical idea of tautology to make our point.
The usual “static” notion of tautology is as “a statement which is vacuously true because it
is compatible with all states of affairs”.
A ∨ ¬A
“It is raining or it is not raining”—truth-functional semantics. This is illustrated (subver-
sively) in Figure 5. But what could a dynamic notion of tautology look like?
Figure 5: Tertium non datur?
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Figure 6: How to beat a Grandmaster
5.4.2 The Copy-Cat Strategy
We begin with a little fable, illustrated by Figure 6:
How to beat an International Chess Grandmaster by the power of pure logic
Since we are relying on logic, rather than on any talent at Chess, we proceed as follows. We
arrange to play two games of Chess with the grandmaster, say Gary Kasparov, once as White
and once as Black. Moreover, we so arrange matters that we start with the game in which
we play as Black. Kasparov makes his opening move; we respond by playing the same move
in the other game—this makes sense, since we are playing as White there. Now Kasparov
responds (as Black) to our move in that game; and we copy that response back in the first
game. We simply proceed in this fashion, copying the moves that our opponent makes in
one board to the other board. The net effect is that we play the same game twice—once as
White, and once as Black. (We have essentially made Kasparov play against himself). Thus,
whoever wins that game, we can claim a win in one of our games against Kasparov! (Even if
the game results in a stalemate, we have done as well as Kasparov over the two games—surely
still a good result!)13
Of course, this idea has nothing particularly to do with Chess. It can be applied to any
two-person game of a very general form. We shall continue to use Chess-boards to illustrate
our discussion, but this underlying generality should be kept in mind.
What are the salient features which can be extracted from this example?
13Our fable is actually recorded as having happened at least once in the chronicles of Chess. Two players
conspired to play this copy-cat strategy against Alekhine in the 1920’s. Alekhine realized what was happening,
and made a tempting offer of a sacrifice to one of his opponents. That opponent was not able to resist such
a coup against the great Alekhine, and departed from the copy-cat strategy to swallow the bait. Then the
symmetry was broken, and Alekhine was able to win easily in both games. Thus we are reminded of the
familiar truth, that logic rarely prevails over psychology in “real life”.
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A dynamic tautology There is a sense (which will shortly be made more precise) in which
the copy-cat strategy can be seen as a dynamic version of the tautology A∨¬A. Note,
indeed, that an essential condition for being able to play the copy-cat is that the roˆles of
the two players are inter-changed on one board as compared to the other. Note also the
disjunctive quality of the argument that we must win in one or other of the two games.
But the copy-cat strategy is a dynamic process: a two-way channel which maintains the
correlation between the plays in the two games.
Conservation of information flow The copy-cat strategy does not create any information;
it reacts to the environment in such a way that information is conserved. It ensures that
exactly the same information flows out to the environment as flows in from it. Thus
one gets a sense of logic appearing in the form of conservation laws for information
dynamics.
The power of copying Another theme which appears here, and which we will see more of
later, concerns the surprising power of simple processes of copying information from one
place to another. Indeed, as we shall eventually see, such processes are computationally
universal.
The geometry of information flow From a dynamical point of view, the copy-cat strat-
egy realizes a channel between the two game boards, by performing the actions of
copying moves. But there is also some implicit geometry here. Indeed, the very idea of
two boards laid out side by side appeals to some basic underlying spatial structure. In
these terms, the copy-cat channel can also be understood geometrically, as creating a
graphical link between these two spatial locations.These two points of view are comple-
mentary, and link the logical perspective to powerful ideas arising in modern geometry
and mathematical physics.
To provide further evidence that the copy-cat strategy embodies more substantial ideas than
might at first be apparent, we consider varying the scenario. Consider now the case where
we play against Kasparov on three boards; one as Black, two as White.
Kasparov Kasparov Kasparov
B
W
W
B
W
B
·
PPPPPPPPPPPPP
♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥
❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡❡
Does the Copy-Cat strategy still work here? In fact, we can easily see that it does not.
Suppose Kasparov makes an opening move m1 in the left-hand board where he plays as
White; we copy it to the board where we play as White; he responds with m2; and we copy
m2 back to the board where Kasparov opened. So far, all has proceeded as in our original
scenario. But now Kasparov has the option of playing a different opening move, m3 say,
in the rightmost board. We have no idea how to respond to this move; nor can we copy it
anywhere, since the board where we play as White is already “in use”. This shows that these
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simple ideas already lead us naturally to the setting of a resource-sensitive logic, in which in
particular the Contraction Rule, which can be expressed as A → A ∧ A (or equivalently as
¬A ∨ (A ∧A)) cannot be assumed to be valid.
What about the other obvious variation, where we play on two boards as White, and one
as Black?
Kasparov Kasparov Kasparov
B
W
B
W
W
B
·
❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨❨
PPPPPPPPPPPPP
♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥
It seems that the copy-cat strategy does still work here, since we can simply ignore one of
the boards where we play as White. However, a geometrical property of the original copy-cat
strategy has been lost, namely a connectedness property, that information flows to every part
of the system. This at least calls the corresponding logical principle of Weakening, which can
be expressed as A ∧A→ A, (or equivalently as ¬A ∨ ¬A ∨A) into question.
We see from these remarks that we are close to the realm of Linear Logic and its variants;
and, mathematically, to the world of monoidal (rather than cartesian) categories.
5.4.3 Game Semantics
These ideas find formal expression in Game Semantics. Games play the role of:
• Interface types for computation modules
• Propositions with dynamic content.
In particular, 2-person games capture the duality of:
• Player vs. Opponent
• System vs. Environment.
Agents are strategies In this setting, we model our agents or processes as strategies for
playing the game. These strategies interact by playing against each other. We obtain a notion
of correctness which is logical in character in terms of the idea of winning strategy—one which
is guaranteed to reach a successful outcome however the environment behaves. This in a sense
replaces (or better, refines) the logical notion of “truth”: winning strategies are our dynamic
version of tautologies (more accurately, of proofs).
Building complex systems by combining games We shall now see how games can be
combined to produce more complex behaviours while retaining control over the interface. This
provides a basis for the compositional understanding of our systems of interacting agents—
understanding the behaviour of a complex system in terms of the behaviour of its parts.
This is crucial for both analysis and synthesis, i.e. for both description and design. These
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operations for building games can be seen as (dynamic forms of) “type constructors” or
“logical connectives”. (The underlying logic here will in fact be Linear Logic).
Duality—“Linear Negation” A⊥ — interchange roˆles of Player and Opponent (reflecting
the symmetry of interaction).
Note that, with this interpretation, negation is involutive:
A⊥⊥ = A.
Tensor — “Linear conjunction”
A⊗B
The idea here is that we combine the two game boards into one system, without any informa-
tion flow between the two sub-systems. (This is the significance of the “wall” separating our
two players, who we shall refer to as Gary (Kasparov) and Nigel (Short)). This connective
has a conjunctive quality, since we must independently be able to play (and to win) in each
conjunct. Note however, that there is no constraint on information flow for the environment,
as it plays against this compound system.
Par — “Linear disjunction”
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AOB
In this case, we have two boards, but one player (who we refer to as the Copy-Cat), indicating
that we do allow information flow for this player between the two game boards. This for
example allows information revealed in one game board by the Opponent to be used against
him on the other game board—as exemplified by the copy-cat strategy. However, note that the
wall appears on the environment’s side now, indicating that the environment is constrained
to play separately on the two boards, with no communication between them.
Thus we have a De Morgan duality between these two connectives, mediated by the Linear
negation:
(A⊗B)⊥ = A⊥OB⊥
(AOB)⊥ = A⊥ ⊗B⊥
The idea is that on one side of the mirror of duality (Player/System for the Tensor, Oppo-
nent/Environment for the Par), we have the constraint of no information flow, while on the
other side, we do have information flow.
We can now reconstrue the Copy-Cat strategy in logical terms:
Kasparov Short
We see that it is indeed a winning strategy for A⊥OA. Moreover, we can define A ⊸ B
(“Linear implication”) by
A⊸ B ≡ A⊥OB
(cf. A ⊃ B ≡ ¬A ∨B.) Then the copy-cat strategy becomes the canonical proof of the most
basic tautology of all: A⊸ A.
The information flow possibilities of Par receive a more familiar logical interpretation in
terms of the Linear implication; namely, that we can use information about the antecedent in
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proving the consequent (and conversely with respect to their negations, if we think of proof
by contraposition).
Thus an entire “linearized” logical structure opens up before us, with a natural interpre-
tation in terms of the dynamics of information flow.
5.4.4 Interaction
We now turn to a key step in the development: the modelling of interaction itself. Construc-
tors create “potentials” for interaction; the operation of plugging modules together so that
they can communicate with each other releases this potential into actual computation.
A⊥OB ≡ A⊸ B B⊥OC ≡ B⊸ C
Here we see two separate sub-systems, each with a compound structure, expressed by the
logical types of their interfaces. What these types tell us is that these systems are composable;
in particular, the output type of the first system, namely B, matches the input type of the
second system. Note that this “logical plug-compatibility” makes essential use of the duality,
just as the copy-cat strategy did. What makes Gary (the player for the first system) a
fit partner for interaction with Nigel (the player for the second system), is that they have
complementary views of their locus of interaction, namely B. Gary will play in this type
“positively”, as Player (he sees it as B), while Nigel will play “negatively”, as Opponent (he
sees it as B⊥). Thus each will become part of the environment of the other—part of the
potential environment of each will be realized by the other, and hence part of the potential
behaviour of each will become actual interaction.
This leads to a dynamical interpretation of the fundamental operation of composition, in
mathematical terms:
A
Gary ✲ B
Nigel ✲ C
A
Gary;Nigel ✲ C
or of the Cut rule, in logical terms:
Cut:
⊢ Γ, A ⊢ A⊥,∆
Γ,∆
. . .
∆Γ
. . .
A⊥A
QP
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Composition as Interaction
The Interaction Game
The picture here shows the new system formed by plugging together the two sub-systems.
The “external interface” to the environment now shows just the left hand board A as input,
and the right hand board C as output. The Cut formula B is hidden from the environment,
and becomes the locus of interaction inside the black box of the system. Suppose that the
Environment makes some move m in C. This is visible only to Nigel, who as a strategy for
B⊸ C has a response. Suppose this response m1 is in B. This is a move by Nigel as Player
in B⊥, hence appears to Gary as a move by Opponent in B. Gary as a strategy for A⊸ B
has a response m2 to this move. If this response is again in B, Nigel sees it as a response
by the environment to his move, and will have a response again; and so on. We thus have a
sequence of moves m1, . . . ,mk in B, ping-ponging back and forth between Nigel and Gary. If,
eventually, Nigel responds to Gary’s last move by playing in C, or Gary responds to Nigel’s
last move by playing in A, then we have the response of the composed strategy Gary;Nigel to
the original move m. Indeed, all that is visible to the Environment is that it played m, and
eventually some response appeared, in A or C.
Moreover, if both Nigel and Gary are winning strategies, then so is the composed strategy;
and the composed strategy will not get stuck forever in the internal ping-pong in B. To see
this, suppose for a contradiction that it did in fact get stuck in B. Then we would have an
infinite play in B following the winning strategy Gary for Player in B, and the same infinite
play following the winning strategy Nigel for Player in B⊥, hence for Opponent in B. Hence
the same play would count as a win for both Player and Opponent. This yields the desired
contradiction.
5.5 Discussion
Game Semantics in the sense discussed in this section has had an extensive development over
the past decade and a half, with a wealth of applications to the semantics of programming
languages, type theories and logics [17, 18, 22, 23, 21, 24, 25, 75]. More recently, there has
been an algorithmic turn, and some striking applications to verification and program analysis
[54, 4, 11, 106].
From the point of view of the general analysis of Information, we see the following promis-
ing lines of development:
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• Game semantics provides a promising arena for exploring the combination of quanti-
tative and qualitative theories of information, as discussed in Section 4, but now in a
dynamic setting. In particular, it provides a setting for quantifying information flow
between agents. We would like to ask quantitative questions about rate of information
flow through a strategy (representing a program, or a proof); how can a system gain
maximum information from its environment while providing minimal information in
return; robustness in the presence of noise, etc.
• As we saw in our discussion of the copy-cat strategy, there is an intuition of logi-
cal principles arising as conservation laws for information flow. (And indeed, in the
case of Multiplicative Linear Logic, the proofs correspond exactly to “generalized copy-
cat strategies”). Can we develop this intuition into a fully-fledged theory? Can we
characterize logical principles as those expressing the conservation principles of this
information flow dynamics?
• There is also the hope that the more structured setting of game semantics will usefully
constrain the exuberant variety of possibilities offered by process algebra, and allow
a sharper exploration of the logical space of possibilities for information dynamics14.
This has already been borne out in part, by the success of game semantics in exploring
the space of programming language semantics. It has been possible to give crisp char-
acterizations of the “shapes” of computations carried out within certain programming
disciplines: including purely functional programming [18, 75], stateful programming
[22, 23], general references [14], programming with non-local jumps and exceptions
[81, 83], non-determinism [67], probability [49], concurrency [55, 56], names [12], poly-
morphism [74, 19] and more. See [24] for an overview (now rather out of date).
There has also been a parallel line of development of giving full completeness results for a
range of logics and type theories, characterizing the “space of proofs” for a logic in terms
of informatic or geometric constraints which pick out those processes which are proofs for
that logic [17, 25, 87, 39, 51, 40]. This allows a new look at such issues as the boundaries
between classical and constructive logic, or the fine structure of polymorphism and
second-order quantification.
• This also gives some grounds for optimism that we can capture—in a “machine-independent”,
and moreover “geometrical”, non-inductive way—what computational processes are,
without referring back to Turing machines or any other explicit machine model.
• In the same spirit as for computability, can we characterize polynomial-time computation
and other complexity classes in such terms?
6 Emergent Logic: The Geometry of Information Flow
Game Semantics carries many vivid intuitions arising from our experiences of game-playing
as a human activity. We were able to take advantage of this in the previous section to explain
14It should be said that the exuberant variety of process algebras has been directly motivated by the vast
range of real-word informatic processes which we need to model. The whole area of information dynamics
is in a dynamic tension between the need on the one hand for descriptive adequacy, and on the other for
mathematical structure and tractability [102, 103]. Process algebra, game semantics, and other approaches
are making valuable inroads into this territory. We need to combine the strengths of all these ideas!
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some key ideas without resorting to any explicit formalization. We now turn to a related
but somewhat different development of interactive models for logic and computation, known
loosely as “Geometry of Interaction particle-style models”.15 We will use this setting to carry
forward our discussion of dynamic models for information flow, with particular emphasis on
the following themes:
• Firstly, the model or family of models we shall discuss is technically simpler to formalize
mathematically than Game Semantics, although also less cloaked in familiar intuitions.
Thus we can introduce some more precision into our discussion without unduly taxing
the reader.
• Secondly, the simple yet expressive nature of these models is itself of conceptual interest.
They show how logic and computation can be understood in terms of simple processes
of copying information from one “place” to another, generalizing what we have already
seen of the copy-cat strategy. In fact, we shall see that mere copying is computationally
universal. Moreover, models of logics and type theories arise from these models; because
of the simplicity of the models, we may reasonably speak of emergent logic—where,
as discussed in the previous section, we may think of the logical character of certain
principles as arising from the fact that they express conservation laws of information
flow.
• We will also be able to make visible how geometrical structure unfolds in these models,
in a striking and unexpected fashion. This part of the development can be carried much
further than we can describe here; there is a thread of ideas linking logical processes of
cut-elimination to diagram algebras, knot theory and topological quantum field theory
[7].
• We shall also begin to see the beginnings of links between Logic and Physics. The
processes we shall describe will be reversible in a very strong sense. This link can in
fact be carried much further, and the same kind of structures we are discussing here can
be used to axiomatize Quantum Mechanics, and to give an incisive analysis of quantum
entanglement and information flow [8, 9, 10, 7].
6.1 Background: Combinatory Logic
It will be convenient to work in the setting of Combinatory Logic [46, 70], which provides one
of the simplest of all the formulations of computability—and moreover one which is purely
algebraic. Combinatory Logic is also the basis for realizability constructions, which provide
powerful methods for building extensional models of strong impredicative type theories and
higher-order logics.
We recall that combinatory logic is the algebraic theory CL given by the signature with
one binary operation (application) written as an infix · , and two constants S andK, subject
to the equations
K · x · y = x
S · x · y · z = x · z · (y · z)
(application associates to the left, so x ·y ·z = (x ·y) ·z). Note that we can define I ≡ S ·K ·K,
and verify that I · x = x.
15See [59, 60, 61, 90, 47, 48], and [16, 17, 2, 3, 15, 13].
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The key fact about the combinators is that they are functionally complete, i.e. they
can simulate the effect of λ-abstraction. Specifically, we can define bracket abstraction on
combinatory terms built using a set of variables X:
λ∗x.M = K ·M (x 6∈ FV(M))
λ∗x. x = I
λ∗x.M ·N = S · (λ∗x.M) · (λ∗x.N)
Moreover (Theorem 2.15 in [70]):
CL ⊢ (λ∗x.M) ·N =M [N/x].
The B combinator can be defined by bracket abstraction from its defining equation:
B · x · y · z = x · (y · z).
The combinatory Church numerals are then defined by
n¯ ≡ (S ·B)n · (K · I)
where we define
an · b = a · (a · · · (a · b) · · · ).
A partial function φ : N ⇀ N is numeralwise represented by a combinatory term M if for all
n ∈ N, if φ(n) is defined and equal to m, then
CL ⊢M · n¯ = m¯
and if φ(n) is undefined, then M · n¯ has no normal form.
The basic result on computational universality of CL is then the following (Theorem 4.18 in
[70]):
Theorem 6.1 The partial functions numeralwise representable in CL are exactly the partial
recursive functions.
Principal Types of Combinators The functional behaviour of combinatory terms can
be described using types. The type expression T → U denotes the set of terms which, when
applied to an argument of type T , produce a result of type U . By convention, → associates to
the right, so we write T1 → T2 → · · ·Tk → U as short-hand for T1 → (T2 → · · · (Tk → U) · · · ).
Now consider the combinator K. The equation K · x · y = x tells us that this combinator
expects to receive an argument x, say of type α, then an argument y, say of type β, and then
returns a result, namely x, of type α. Thus its type has the form
K : α→ (β → α).
In fact, if we take α and β to be type variables, this is the principal, i.e. the most general, type
of this combinator. A similar but more complicated argument establishes that the principal
type of the S combinator is
S : (α→ β → γ)→ (α→ β)→ (α→ γ).
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These principal types can in fact be computed by the Hindley-Milner algorithm [69] from
the defining equations for the combinators. (This algorithm is nowadays routinely used to
perform “type-checking” for modern programming languages with polymorphic types.)
Curry observed [46] that the principal types of the combinators correspond to axiom
schemes for a Hilbert-style proof system for Intuitionistic implicational logic—with the ap-
plication operation corresponding to Modus Ponens. This is the “Curry” part of the Curry-
Howard isomorphism. Thus combinators are to Hilbert-style systems as λ-calculus is to
Natural Deduction.
The Curry Combinators Curry’s original set of combinators was not the Scho¨nfinkel
combinators S and K, but rather the combinators B, C, K, and W:
B · x · y · z = x · (y · z)
C · x · y · z = x · z · y
W · x · y = x · y · y
These combinators are equivalent to the Scho¨nfinkel combinators, in the sense that the two
sets are inter-definable [33, 70]. In particular, S can be defined from B, C, I and W. They
have the following principal types:
I : α→ α Axiom
B : (β → γ)→ (α→ β)→ α→ γ Cut
C : (α→ β → γ)→ β → α→ γ Exchange
K : α→ β → α Weakening
W : (α→ α→ β)→ α→ β Contraction
Thus we see that in logical terms, B expresses the transitivity of implication, or the Cut
rule; C is the Exchange rule; W is Contraction; and K is Weakening. Curry’s analysis of
substitution is close to Gentzen’s analysis of proofs.
6.2 Linear Combinatory Logic
We shall now present another system of combinatory logic: Linear Combinatory Logic [3,
13, 15]. This can be seen as a finer-grained system into which standard combinatory logic,
as presented in the previous section, can be interpreted. By exposing some finer structure,
Linear Combinatory Logic offers a more accessible and insightful path towards our goal of
mapping universal functional computation into a simple model of computation as copying.
Linear Combinatory Logic can be seen as the combinatory analogue of Linear Logic [58];
the interpretation of standard Combinatory Logic into Linear Combinatory Logic corresponds
to the interpretation of Intuitionistic Logic into Linear Logic. Note, however, that the com-
binatory systems we are considering are type-free and “logic-free” (i.e. purely equational).
Definition 6.2 A Linear Combinatory Algebra (A, ·, !) consists of the following data:
• An applicative structure (A, ·)
• A unary operator ! : A→ A
• Distinguished elements B, C, I, K, D, δ, F, W of A
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satisfying the following identities (we associate · to the left and write x · !y for x · ( !(y)), etc.)
for all variables x, y, z ranging over A):
1. B · x · y · z = x · (y · z) Composition/Cut
2. C · x · y · z = (x · z) · y Exchange
3. I · x = x Identity
4. K · x · !y = x Weakening
5. D · !x = x Dereliction
6. δ · !x = ! !x Comultiplication
7. F · !x · !y = !(x · y) Monoidal Functoriality
8. W · x · !y = x · !y · !y Contraction
The notion of LCA corresponds to a Hilbert style axiomatization of the {!,⊸} fragment of
linear logic [3, 28, 118]. The principal types of the combinators correspond to the axiom
schemes which they name. They can be computed by a Hindley-Milner style algorithm [69]
from the above equations:
1. B : (β ⊸ γ)⊸ (α⊸ β)⊸ α⊸ γ
2. C : (α⊸ β⊸ γ)⊸ (β⊸ α⊸ γ)
3. I : α⊸ α
4. K : α⊸ !β ⊸ α
5. D : !α⊸ α
6. δ : !α⊸ ! !α
7. F : !(α⊸ β)⊸ !α⊸ !β
8. W : ( !α⊸ !α⊸ β)⊸ !α⊸ β
Here ⊸ is a linear function type (linearity means that the argument is used exactly once),
and !α allows arbitrary copying of an object of type α.
A Standard Combinatory Algebra consists of a pair (A, ·s) where A is a nonempty set and
·s is a binary operation on A, together with distinguished elements Bs,Cs, Is,Ks, andWs of
A, satisfying the following identities for all x, y, z ranging over A:
1. Bs ·s x ·s y ·s z = x ·s (y ·s z)
2. Cs ·s x ·s y ·s z = (x ·s z) ·s y
3. Is ·s x = x
4. Ks ·s x ·s y = x
5. Ws ·s x ·s y = x ·s y ·s y
This is just a combinatory algebra with interpretations of the Curry combinators. Note that
this is equivalent to the more familiar definition of SK-combinatory algebra as discussed in
the previous sub-section.
Let (A, ·, !) be a linear combinatory algebra. We define a binary operation ·s on A as
follows: for a, b ∈ A, a ·s b ≡ a · !b. We define D
′ ≡ C · (B ·B · I) · (B ·D · I). Note that
D′ · x · !y = x · y.
Now consider the following elements of A.
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1. Bs ≡ C · (B · (B ·B ·B) · (D
′ · I)) · (C · ((B ·B) · F) · δ)
2. Cs ≡ D
′ ·C
3. Is ≡ D
′ · I
4. Ks ≡ D
′ ·K
5. Ws ≡ D
′ ·W
Theorem 6.3 Let (A, ·, !) be a linear combinatory algebra. Then (A, ·s) with ·s and the
elements Bs,Cs, Is,Ks,Ws as defined above is a standard combinatory algebra.
Finally, we mention a special case which will arise in our model. An Affine Combinatory
Algebra is a Linear Combinatory Algebra such that the K combinator satisfies the stronger
equation
K · x · y = x.
Note that in this case we can define the identity combinator: I ≡ C ·K ·K.
6.3 Universal Computation by Copy-Cats
Our aim is to describe an interactive model for logic and computation, which can be under-
stood in two complementary ways:
• A model built from simple dynamical processes of copying information from one place
to another.
• A model built from simple geometrical constructions, in which computation is inter-
preted as geometric simplification—tracing paths through tangles, and yanking them
straight.
We begin with the dynamical interpretation. Here we think of an informatic token or particle
traversing a path through logical (discrete) “space” and “time”. For this purpose, we assume
a set Pos of positions or places in “logical space”. For the purposes of obtaining a type-
free universal model of computation, it is important that Pos is (countably) infinite. (So we
could just take it to be the set N of natural numbers). The only significant property of the
instantaneous state of the particle is its current position p ∈ Pos.
The processes we shall consider will be very simple, “history-free” or “time-independent”
reversible dynamics, which we represent as partial injective functions
f : Pos ⇀ Pos.
Such a process maps a particle in position p at any time t to the position f(p) at time t+ 1;
or may be undefined. In fact, we will have no need to make time explicit, since discrete time
will be modelled adequately by function composition.16Thus the path traced by the particle
starting from position p0 under the dynamics f will be
p0, p1, p2, . . . , pn, . . .
16The non-trivial dynamics we shall actually consider, which will arise when we model function application,
will in fact come from the interaction between two very simple functions — the “ping-ponging” back and forth
between them, in the terms of our informal discussion of interaction in Section 5. Note that all elements of our
combinatory algebra, whether they appear as “functions” or “arguments” in the context of a given application,
will be represented by functions on positions, corresponding to processes or strategies.
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where pi+1 = f(pi). This dynamics is clearly reversible. Since f is a partial injective map, its
inverse f−1 (i.e. the relational converse of f) is also a partial injective function on Pos, and
pi = f
−1(pi+1), so we can trace the reverse path using the inverse dynamics.
In fact, it will be possible to restrict ourselves to an even simpler class of dynamics: namely
the fixed-point free partial involutions, i.e. those partial injective functions f : Pos ⇀ Pos
satisfying
f = f−1, f ∩ 1Pos = ∅.
Thus such a map satisfies:
f(x) = y ⇐⇒ x = f(y), f(x) 6= x.
A partial involution on a set X is equivalently described as a partial partition of X into
2-element subsets:
X ⊇
⋃
E, where E = {{x, y} | f(x) = y}.
This defines an undirected graph Gf = (X,E). Clearly each vertex in this graph has at
most one incident edge. Conversely, every graph G = (X,E) with this property determines a
unique partial involution f on X, with Gf = G.
Partial involutions will be our model at this basic level of “copy-cat processes”; they simply
copy information back and forth between pairs of “locations”. It is somewhat remarkable that
such simple maps can form a universal computational model.
6.3.1 Function Application as Interaction
Our next and key step is to model functional application by interaction of these simple
dynamical processes. This will in fact be a bare-bones version of the game-theoretic model of
composition as interaction which we gave in the previous section. We shall view a “functional
process” which can be applied to other processes as a two-input two-output function
f
The interpretation of these two pairs of input-output lines is that the first will be used to
connect the functional process to its argument, and the second to connect it to its external en-
vironment or context—which will interact with the function to consume its output. Formally,
this is a function
f : Pos+ Pos −→ Pos+ Pos.
Note that we have the used the disjoint union (two copies of Pos) rather than the cartesian
product Pos × Pos (infinitely many copies of Pos). This is because a particle coming in as
input must either be on the first input line, or (in the exclusive sense) on the second input
line; and similarly for the outputs.
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However, since we want to make a type-free universal model of computation, we must
reduce all our processes to one-input one-output functions. This is where our assumption
that Pos is infinite becomes important. It allows us to define a splitting function s:
s : Pos+ Pos
∼=✲ Pos.
We can think of this as splitting logical space into two disjoint “address spaces”. This allows
us to transform any one-input/one-output function into a two-input/two-output function,
or conversely, by conjugation. Thus if f : Pos → Pos is any process, we can view it as a
two-input, two-output functional process, namely
s−1 ◦ f ◦ s : Pos+ Pos −→ Pos+ Pos.
6.3.2 Geometrical Representation of Application
Suppose we wish to apply f , qua functional process, to g, where both f and g are partial
involutions on Pos. The application operation f • g is indicated pictorially as follows.
❄
◗
◗
◗
❄
✑
✑
✑f11
f12
f22
f21
❄ ❄
❄
f
❄
❄ ❄
p
s−1 ◦ f ◦ s
❄ ❄f • g(p)
g
As already explained, we conjugate f by s to turn it into something with the right shape to
be a functional process. Then we connect it to its argument, g, by a feedback loop using the
first input and output lines of f ′ = s−1 ◦ f ◦ s. The residual behaviour by which the process
resulting from the application communicates with its environment uses the second input and
output lines. The full geometric significance of how this notion of application works will
become apparent when we discuss the interpretation of the combinators in this setting. But
we can give the dynamical interpretation of application immediately. Suppose the process f •g
receives a token p on its input. The function f ′ may immediately dispatch this to its second
output line as p′—in which case, that will be the response of f • g. This would correspond
to the behaviour of a constant function, which knows its output without consulting its input.
Otherwise, f ′ may dispatch p to its first output line, as p1. This is then fed as input to
g. Thus this corresponds to the function represented by f ′ interrogating its argument. If
g(p1) = p2, then this is fed back around the loop as input to f
′ (now on its first input line).
We may continue in this fashion, ping-ponging between f ′ (on its first input/output lines)
and g around the feedback loop. Eventually, f ′ may have seen enough, and decide to despatch
the token on its second output line, as p′. We then say that f • g(p) = p′. In other words, to
the external environment, the whole interaction between f ′ and g has been hidden inside the
black box of the application f • g; it only sees the final response p′ to the initial entry of the
token at p.
All of this should seem very familiar. It follows exactly the same general lines as the
game-semantical interpretation of composition which we presented in the previous section.
We note the following points of difference:
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• The notion of composition we discussed in the previous section was fully symmetrical
between the two agents involved, reflecting the classical nature of the underlying logic.
Here, we are discussing functional computation, and our description of application re-
flects the asymmetry between function and argument.
• Since we are dealing with a type-free universal model of computation, we must allow
some partiality in our model. The token may get trapped in the feedback loop for ever,
for example, so the involutions giving the dynamics must be partial in general. This is
unavoidable, for well-known metamathematical reasons.
• We are also considering a very restricted, simple notion of dynamics here. Certainly in
the game semantics context, we would not want in general to limit ourselves to such a
restricted class of strategies.
6.3.3 Algebraic Description of Application
We now give a formal definition of the application operation. Firstly, consider the map
f ′ = s−1 ◦ f ◦ s : Pos + Pos −→ Pos + Pos. Each input lies in either the first component of
the disjoint union, or (exclusive or) the second, and similarly for the corresponding output.
This leads to a decomposition of f ′ into four disjoint partial maps fij, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, where fij
maps the i’th input summand to the j’th output summand. Note that f ′ can be recovered as
the union of these four maps. Since f ′ is a partial involution, these maps will also be partial
involutions. The decomposition is indicated pictorially in the preceding diagram. Now we
can define
f • g = f22 ∪ f21; g; (f11; g)
∗; f12 ,
where we use relational algebra (union R∪ S, relational composition R;S and reflexive tran-
sitive closure R∗) to write down formally exactly the information flow we described in our
informal explanation of application above. It is a nice exercise to show that partial involutions
are closed under application; that is, that f • g is again a partial involution.
6.4 Combinators as Copy-Cats
At this point, we have defined our applicative structure (A, •), where A is the set of partial
involutions. We must now show that we can define combinators as partial involutions such
that this structure will indeed form a Linear Combinatory Algebra. From now on, we shall
mainly resort to drawing pictures, rather than writing algebraic expressions.
6.4.1 The Identity Combinator
Our first example is the simplest, and yet already shows the essence of the matter. The
identity combinator I is represented by the twist map, which copies any token on its first
input line to the second output line, and vice versa. This is depicted as follows.
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Ix
❄
❏
❏
❏
❄
✡
✡
✡
❄ ❄
What is surprising, and striking, is the geometric picture of why this works: that is, why the
equation I • x = x holds:
❄ ❄
❄ ❄
◗
◗
◗
✑
✑
✑
x
=
❄
x
❄
I • x = x
We see that geometrically, this is a matter of yanking the string straight ; while dynamically,
we picture the token flowing once around the feedback loop, and exiting exactly according to
x.
Once again, we can recognize this combinator as a new description of an old friend from
the previous section. This is exactly the copy-cat strategy! Reduced to its essence, it simply
copies “tokens” or “moves” from one place to another, and vice versa; the logical requirement
is that one of these places should be positive (or output); while the other should be negative
(or input).
6.4.2 The Composition Combinator
We now consider the composition combinator B. We interpret it as a combination of copy-
cats. That is, it plays copy-cat between three pairs of input and output lines. (Thus, in
particular, it is a partial involution).
B
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
z y︷ ︸︸ ︷ x︷ ︸︸ ︷
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
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Note that we can regard this combinator as having six inputs and six outputs, as shown in
the diagram, simply by iterating the trick of conjugating it by the splitting map s. Our reason
for giving it this many inputs and outputs is based on the functionality of B, i.e. its principal
type. It expects to get three arguments, the first two of which will themselves be applied to
arguments, and hence should each have two inputs and two outputs.
Once again, the real insight as to how this combinator works will come from the geometry,
or equivalently the particle dynamics. We let the picture speak for itself.
z y x
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
z
y
x
❄ ❄
❄ ❄❄
❄
B · x · y · z = x · (y · z)
6.4.3 Other Affine Combinators
The remaining Linear Combinators can be described in similar style. We simply show the
definition for C.
C
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
z y x︷ ︸︸ ︷
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
C · x · y · z = x · z · y
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We note that geometrically, this is our first example of a non-planar combinator.17 This gives
a hint of the geometrical possibilities lurking just below the surface. We shall not pursue this
fascinating theme here for lack of space, but see [7].
In fact, the algebra is naturally affine. We can define a K combinator:
K
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
❄ ❄ ❄
❄ ❄ ❄
y x
K · x · y = x
However, note that another topological property is violated here; the first input and output
lines are disconnected from the information flow. (Recall our discussion of the second variation
of the Chess copy-cat scenario).
6.4.4 Duplication
We shall conclude our discussion of the algebra by sketching how explicit duplication of
arguments is handled. This is needed for full expressive power.
We define another auxiliary function
p : N× Pos
∼=✲ Pos
which splits logical space into countably many disjoint copies. Again, this requires the as-
sumption that Pos is infinite. Using this, we can define an operation !f which is intended to
produce infinitely many copies of f . These are obtained by simply tagging each copy with a
natural number, i.e. we define:
!f = p ◦ (1N × f) ◦ p
−1.
We can then define W satisfying
W · x · !y = x · !y · !y.
The W combinator
17Our diagrammatic conventions obscure this point, since all our diagrams involve over-crossing lines. For
an explicit discussion of planarity and an alternative diagrammatics, see [7].
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W′
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
✡
✡
✡
❏
❏
❏
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
!y︷ ︸︸ ︷ x︷ ︸︸ ︷
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
(l.i, n) (r.j,m)
(i, n) (j,m)
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
This combinator can be understood as effecting a “translation between dialects”:
• x sees two arguments, each in many copies.
• !y provides one argument, in as many copies as needed.
The combinator in effect decomposes into infinitely many copy-cat strategies, using a suitable
splitting function to split the “address space” of the countably many copies of !y into two
infinite, disjoint parts, and copying between each of these and the corresponding argument
position of x.
6.5 Putting the Pieces Together
We can round out the descriptions of the combinators as partial involutions to obtain a Linear
Combinatory Algebra. By Theorem 6.3, this yields a standard Combinatory Algebra, and
hence by Theorem 6.1 a universal model of computation. Moreover, realizability constructions
over this Combinatory Algebra provide models for higher-order logics and type theories. Thus
we have fulfilled our programme for this Section, of exhibiting the power of copying, leading
to emergent models of logic and computation.
6.6 Discussion
Our gentle description of the partial involutions model in this section has merely indicated
some first steps in this topic. We list some further directions:
• There is a general axiomatic formulation of this construction in terms of traced monoidal
categories [78], with instances for deterministic, non-deterministic, probabilistic and
quantum interaction [2, 13].
• The connections with reversible computation have been mentioned; this topic is carried
further in [5].
• These models have some striking applications to the analysis of proofs, and of defin-
ability in various type theories, via Full Completeness theorems for models arising by
realizability constructions over the basic Geometry of Interaction models [15].
• Current work is showing that the suggestive connections with geometry can be carried
much further. In particular, there are connections with diagram algebras such as the
Temperley-Lieb algebra, and hence with the Jones polynomial and ensuing developments
[7].
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• Finally, as already mentioned, there are strong connections with Quantum Information
and Computation, which deserve a proper account of their own. Some references are
[8, 9, 10].
7 Concluding Remarks
The underlying project we have tried to illuminate in this article, via some partial exemplifica-
tions, has been that of developing a free-standing, syntax-independent Information Dynamics,
worthy of the name.
In our view, this project is significant not just for Computer Science, but for Applied
Logic, and for the theory and philosophy of information in general.
7.1 Combining Static and Dynamic
We have already emphasized the importance of combining qualitative and quantitative aspects
of information, in the context of both static and dynamic theories. We conclude by making
the point that it can be fruitful to combine static and dynamic aspects as well.18
We can set this in a wider context. One can distinguish two views on how Logic relates
to Structure:
1. The Descriptive View. Logic is used to talk about structure. This is the view
taken in Model Theory, and in most of the uses of Logic (Temporal logics, MSO etc.) in
Verification in Computer Science. It is by far the more prevalent and widely-understood
view.
2. The Intrinsic View. Logic is taken to embody structure. This is, implicitly or explic-
itly, the view taken in the Curry-Howard isomorphism, and more generally in Structural
Proof Theory, and in (much of) Categorical Logic. In the Curry-Howard isomorphism,
one is not using logic to talk about functional programming; rather, logic (in this aspect)
is functional programming.
The descriptive view is well exemplified by Dynamic Logic and other modal logics. Indeed,
one can use modal logics to talk about games and strategies, while on the other hand these
can be used as a manifestation of the intrinsic view, modelling proofs as certain interactive
processes. In some sense the intrinsic view is global, giving the structure of a type theory or
semantic category; while the descriptive view is local, exploring the structure of particular
games (objects) or strategies (morphisms). There is no reason why these two views cannot
be brought fruitfully together, e.g. using a suitable modal logic to verify the logical soundness
properties of strategies such as the copy-cat strategies we have discussed.
This further attempt to draw some of the strands we have examined in this article together
is one of many promising directions for future work.
7.2 The Fundamental Challenge
The most fundamental challenge faced by the project of an Informatic Dynamics is in our
view this: how to expose what is really robust and intrinsic structure, a bedrock on which
18This point was emphasized by Johan van Benthem (personal communication).
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we can build, as opposed to what is more or less arbitrarily chosen.19 This problem is all the
more acute, given the ever-increasing range of concrete informatic phenomena which we are
continually being challenged to model by the rapidly-moving world of Information Technology.
Without under-estimating these difficulties, we find numerous, if “local”, grounds for
optimism in the theories we have surveyed, in the insights and structures which they have
brought to light. We venture to believe that real and exciting progress will continue to
be made, and that a fundamental and widely applicable scientific theory of Information,
incorporating qualitative and structural as well as quantitative features, is in the making.
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